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1. INTRODUCTION
In light of the growing globalization of markets and industries
it is inevitable that antitrust authorities, as the guardians of fair
competition, are increasingly unable to restrict their investigations
to their own soil and markets.' This applies not only to national
authorities like the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice
("DOJ") or the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") in the United
States, but also to supranational authorities such as the European
Commission.2 These authorities must look at the mergers that take
place in their own backyards as well as in other jurisdictions and
assess what effect these "foreign" mergers may have on their own
markets. Therefore, it is not surprising that mergers that first ap-
pear to be purely American in nature, such as Boeing and McDon-
nell Douglas,3 AOL and Time Warner,4 or MCI WorldCom and
* Of the Munich Bar; LL.D., Christian-Albrechts-University, Kiel, Germany;
LL.M., University of Cambridge, England; ORRIcK HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE, Lon-
don.
1 See, e.g., Donald Baker, Antitrust Merger Review in an Era of Escalating Cross-
Border Transactions and Effects, 18 WIS. INT'L L.J. 577, 578 (2000); Eleanor M. Fox,
Toward World Antitrust and Market Access, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 3 (1997); William M.
Hannay, Transnational Competition Law Aspects of Mergers and Acquisitions, 20 Nw.
J. INT'L L. & Bus. 287 (2000); Barry J. Rodger, Competition Policy, Liberalism and
Globalization: A European Perspective, 6 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 289, 312 (2000).
2 Commission of the European Communities [hereinafter "the Commission"].
3 Case IV/M.877, Boeing/McDonnell Douglas v. Commission, 1997 O.J. (L
336) 16 [hereinafter Boeing/McDonnell Douglas].
4 Case COMP/M.1845, AOL/Time Warner v. Commission (2000) [hereinafter
AOL/Time Warner], available at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/competition
/mergers/cases/decisions/m1845_en.pdf.
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Sprint (the first U.S. merger which the Commission prevented) 5
have been the subject of intense scrutiny by the Commission.
6
The decision of the Commission on July 3, 20017 to stop the
merger between General Electric Company ("GE") and Honeywell
International, Inc. ("Honeywell") on the basis of EC merger con-
trol8 was groundbreaking. It was the first time the Commission
stopped a U.S. merger that had already received clearance from its
"home" authority, in this case the DOJ. This broke a tacit under-
standing between merger regulators that if two big American or-
ganizations plan to merge, the American authorities would usually
rule first and the Europeans would follow their lead in approving,
disapproving, or imposing conditions to safeguard competition in
Europe.9
Not surprisingly, the prohibition of the merger has led to some
very harsh remarks on the western side of the Atlantic.0 Prior to
5 Case COMP/M.1741, MCI WorldCom/Sprint v. Commission (2000) [here-
inafter MCI WorldConi/Sprint], available at http://europa.eu.int/comm
/competition/mergers/cases/ decisions/ m1741_en.pdf.
6 The latest decision in this respect was made in the takeover of U.S.-based
travel online travel operator Galileo International, Inc., by Cendant Corp., a travel
and residential real estate services company also based in the United States; see
Commission Press Release, Commission Clears Acquisition of Sole Control over
Galileo by Cendant (Both U.S. Based), IP/01/1307, available at http://www
.eurunion.org/news/press/ 2 001/2001070 .htm (Sept. 24,2001).
7 Case COMP/M.2220, General Electric/Honeywell v. Commission (2001)
[hereinafter GE/Honeywell], available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition
/ mergers/ cases/ decisions/ m220Len.pdf.
8 This Article will refer to the merger control of the European Community
("EC") rather than the European Union ("EU") because the merger control rules
pertain only to the EC, and not to the EU. With regard to the relationship be-
tween the two, it can be said that the EC (together with the Coal and Steel Com-
munity and the European Atomic Energy Community) forms one pillar of the EU,
with the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and the Cooperation in Criminal
Matters forming the other two pillars.
9 See Labour Turns to City, THE ECONOMIST, May 24, 1997, at 14; Sondra
Roberto, The Boeing/McDonnell Douglas Merger Review: A Serious Stretch of European
Competition Powers, 24 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 593, 616 (1998).
10 U.S. Republican Senator Phil Gramm said on part-GE-owned CNBC: "It's a
very real question what power the EU should have in dealing with two compa-
nies that are fundamentally American companies," quoted in Chris Marsden, U.S.
and Europe split on GE Takeover of Honeywell, World Socialist Website at
http://www.wsws.org/articles/2001/jun2001/gec-j2.shtm (June 21, 2001).
Democratic Senators John "Jay" D. Rockefeller IV and Ernest F. Hollings warned
of possible retaliatory action by Washington. See William Drozdiak, European
Union Kills GE Deal, WASH. POsr, July 4, 2001, at Al. U.S.-Treasury Secretary
O'Neill called the decision "off the wall" and said that something needed to be
done to bring the EU back in line, Brian M. Carney, Loggerheads: Mario Monti, Cen-
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the decision, U.S. President George W. Bush even raised the issue
during his trip to Europe in June 2001, causing an equally ardent
response from the Commission." However, at face value, this de-
cision was not that surprising, as it was only a matter of time be-
fore the European and U.S. systems would produce different re-
sults.12 These differences have been there all along, and are well
known and publicized-facts that make the reaction even more
surprising.13 The decision also showed a new approach by the
Commission regarding a substantive test for the legality of a
merger, allowing for consideration of bundling of goods and serv-
ices from two different markets.14
Despite the harsh words, the Commission's decision should be
looked at without prejudice. The Commission's view on the mar-
kets concerned and the position of GE and Honeywell therein, is,
in some areas, certainly debatable. But this does not mean that the
decision itself was a politically motivated attack on American
business, 5 without substance in European law. Rather, as will be
shown below, the outcome is the result of differences between the
approaches of U.S. and European merger contro14-a fact that
tral Planner, WALL ST. J. EUR., July 6, 2001, at 6. Similar comments were made
when the Commission investigated the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger. See
Amy Ann Karpel, The European Commission's Decision on the Boeing-McDonnell
Douglas Merger and the Need for Greater U.S. - EU Cooperation in the Merger Field, 47
AM. U. L. REv. 1029,1031 (1998); Roberto, supra note 9, at 594.
11 Competition Commissioner Mario Monti is quoted as having said: "I de-
plore attempts to misinform the public and to trigger political intervention ....
This is entirely out of place in an antitrust case and has no impact on the Commis-
sion whatsoever. This is a matter of law and economics, not politics." Kevin
Done et al., Dispute over GE Takeover Deepens, FIN. TIMES, June 19,2001, at 1.
12 Mario Monti, Antitrust in the U.S. and Europe: A History of Convergence,
Speech presented at the General Counsel Roundtable of the American Bar Asso-
ciation, at 3 (Nov. 14, 2001), available at http://www.euruniortorg/news/
speeches/2001/011114mm.htm.
13 John DeQ. Briggs & Howard Rosenblatt, A Bundle of Trouble: The Aftermath
of GE/Honeywell, 16 ANTImusr 26 (Fall 2001).
14 See infra Part 4.2.2.1.2.2.3.
15 The decision was also not, as has been suggested, a revenge for the U.S.
blocking of the BOC-Air Products/Air Liquide merger which already had re-
ceived the approval of the Commission, or even for the decision of President Bush
to abandon the Kyoto accord.
16 European merger control is based on the question of Market Dominance
("MD") whereas U.S. merger control follows the Substantive Lessening of Com-
petition test ("SLC"). The details of the different systems will be discussed, infra
Part 2.1.22.
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does not per se affect the validity of the European decision.' 7 It
should also be noted that the mere fact that the Commission, as a
non-U.S. authority, looked into a merger of two U.S. companies,
was not based on some kind of European neo-imperialism but on a
legal concept originally developed in the United States and only
subsequently adopted and applied by other countries and by the
Commission.
This Article first provides a brief overview 18 of EC competition
law. The rules and procedures of EC Competition law show the
legal framework within which the Commission acted. The Article
will then address how this framework compares to U.S. antitrust
law. It will also look at previous Commission decisions with re-
gard to mergers between U.S. companies. Next, the decision of the
Commission in GE/Honeywell will be outlined and analyzed in de-
tail. Finally, the Article will address some of the comments and
criticisms of the EC made during and after the procedure that led
to the final lapse of the merger.
2. MERGER CONTROL IN THE EC
In order to understand the Commission's decision in
GE/Honeywell, it is necessary to outline how European merger
control works and how GE/Honeywfvell fits into this framework.
Where appropriate, parallels to the U.S. system will be drawn.
2.1. The European Merger Control Regulation
Specific rules on merger control as part of EC Law are rela-
tively new,19 especially when compared to the U.S. merger control
17 Cf. Charles Grant, Euro-Muscle: The EU is Emerging as a Superpower, and
That's Good for the U.S., Too, WASH. POST, July 8, 2001, at B2. Karpel commented to
the same effect in her discussion of the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas decision. See
Karpel supra note 10, at 1029.
18 It is not intended to nor can it encompass in depth all the aspects of Euro-
pean Merger Control. For a comprehensive overview of the European merger
control regime, see CHRISTOPHER JONES & ENRIQUE GONZALEZ-DiAZ, THE EEC
MERGER. RGULAION (1992); JOHN COOK & CVMSr0oPiM KrBSV, EC MTeger Controt
(1999); Jose RIVAS, THE EU MERGER REGULATION AND THE ANATOMY OF THE MERGER
TASK FORCE (2000).
19 There has been a merger provision in Article 4 of the Treaty Establishing
the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140, as
amended Treaties Establishing the European Communities (EC Off'l Pub. Off.
1987), as it results from Title III of the Treaty Establishing the European Union:
Provisions Amending the Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Coin-
328 [23:2
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rules enshrined in the U.S. Clayton Act of 1914.20 It was only in
1990 that the European Merger Control Regulation ("ECMR")21
came into effect.22 Before the enactment of the ECMR, mergers
were dealt with by the general rules of competition law 23 as laid
down in EC Articles 81 and 8224 which address concerted practices
and the abuse of a dominant position and parallel Section 1 and
Section 2 of the U.S. Sherman Antitrust Act. Merger control law
and competition law in general on the European continent cannot
claim as long a history as that of similar law in the United States.
To the contrary, only very few countries had a merger control sys-
tem established before the ECMR came into effect 25 and even gen-
eral competition law has only recently been enacted in many
countries.26 This fact must not be underestimated because it shows
munity, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 145, art. H(1)-H(21), although this provision is only ap-
plicable to specific industries.
20 However, the relevant provision in the Clayton Act (§ 7) did not have
much practical relevance until the changes effected by the Celler-Kefauver Act of
1950. Before this, merger control in the United States was administered mostly
under the provisions of general competition law enshrined in section one of the
Sherman Act (between 1914 and 1950 only fifteen mergers were overturned in the
United States, of which ten were based on the Sherman Act).
21 Council Regulation 4064/89 EEC of 21 December 1989 on the Control of
the Concentration between Undertakings, 1990 O.J. (L 257) 13, as amended by
Council Regulation 1310/97 EC of June 30, 1997, 1998 O.J. (L 180) 1 [hereinafter
ECMR].
22 For a history of the European merger control regulation, see RICHARD
WHiSH, COMPEITION LAW 735 (4th ed. 2001).
23 See Case 6/72, Europemballage Corp. and Continental Can Co. Inc. v.
Commission, 1973 E.C.R. 215, 1973 C.M.L.R. 199 [hereinafter Continental Can];
Case 142/84,156/84, British American Tobacco Co. Ltd. and R. J. Reynolds Indus.
Inc. v. Comm. of the Eur. Union, 1987 E.C.R 4487,2 C.M.L.R. 551 (1987).
24 Treaty Establishing the European Community, May 1, 1999, 1997 O.J. (C
340) 173 (Consolidated Version). This is the Treaty of Rome, 1957, as amended by
the Single European Act, 1986, the Maastricht Treaty on the European Union,
1992, and by the Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union,
The Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts,
Ocr. 2,1997 O.J. (C 340) 1. In accordance with the practice of the European Court
of Justice, articles of the Treaty Establishing the European Community as it stands
after May 1, 1999 will be cited using "EC," whereas articles of the Treaty before
that date will be cited using "of the EC-Treaty."
25 The United Kingdom first introduced merger control in the Monopolies
and Mergers Act of 1965. Germany added merger control provisions to its Act
Against Restraints of Competition in 1973,1973 BGBI. I S. 917. France introduced
merger control in 1986 (Ordinance No. 86-1243 of December 1, 1986, J.O. 1986, p.
14,773, modified by Law No. 96-588 of July 1,1996, J.0. 1996, p. 9983).
26 Germany took the lead in Europe by introducing a so-called cartel regula-
tion in 1923, i.e., more than thirty years after the Sherman Act. The German ex-
2002]
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that there is less, if any, tradition of administering antitrust and
merger control rules than in the United States, where these rules
have been part of the law for almost a century.27
Under the ECMR, all (and only) concentrations with a "Com-
munity Dimension" fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
European authorities as opposed to that of one or more national
authorities.28 The criterion of Community Dimension is thus an
indication of the dual role which the ECMR plays: it not only lays
down rules to determine when a merger is lawful, it also identifies
the areas of responsibility of the European and national authorities.
Having established a Community Dimension, the substantive test
under the ECMR asks whether or not a merger is "compatible with
the Common Market."
2.1.1. Concentration with a Community Dimension
The term "concentration" in ECMR Article 3 encompasses
mergers, acquisitions, and structural joint ventures.29 In recital 23
ample was, however, not followed by other European countries. The situation in
the United Kingdom was somewhat different. Although it introduced the Mo-
nopolies and Restrictive Practices Act as late as 1948, the Common Law doctrine
of restraints of trade is much older and has roots as far back as the middle ages.
This law also had, as the following note shows, considerable influence on the U.S.
law.
27 Competition law was actually applied prior to that date, through reliance
on principles of Common Law. Senator Sherman himself, when introducing the
new legislation, stated that the act bore nothing new but only "applies old and
well recognized principles of the common law." 21 CONG. REc. 2456 (1890). In
Standard Oil of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 51-62 (1910), the Supreme Court
considered the situation before the passage of the Sherman Act at length, referring
specifically to the law in England.
28 According to Article 22(1), ECMR concentrations, whether they are of
Community Dimension or not, are exclusively dealt with by the ECMR while the
rules of general competition law do not apply. However, if a joint venture quali-
fies as a concentration within the meaning of ECMR Article 3, it can be assessed
under general competition laws if it does not meet the revenue criteria for a
Community Dimension.
29 It is important to note that the ECMR is only applicable to joint ventures
that are jointly controlled by the parent companies. Furthermore, the joint ven-
ture must perform, on a Iasting basis, all the functions of an autonomous eco-
nomic entity (full function joint venture). Until the changes in 1997, the ECMR
distinguished between concentrative joint ventures and cooperative joint ven-
tures. Council Regulation 1310/97 EC of June 30, 1997 Amending Regulation
4064/89 EEC on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, 1997 O.J.
(L 180) 1. The Commission described the details of how to distinguish between
the two in a 1989 notice. Commission Notice on the Distinction Between Concen-
trative and Cooperative Joint Ventures under Council Regulation 4064/89 EEC on
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol23/iss2/4
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of the ECMR, the concept of concentration is defined as covering
only those operations that bring about a lasting change in the
structure of the undertaking concerned. The Commission has
published a notice30 on how it intends to interpret the term con-
centration.31 If a deal does not qualify as a concentration within the
meaning of ECMR Article 3, the Commission (and, depending on
their own rules, possibly the national authorities) may scrutinize it
under the rules of general competition law. In these circumstances
it would also be possible for the national authorities to investigate
under their merger control rules. This could happen, for example,
in the case of a joint venture where the parent companies do not
exercise joint control.3 2
A concentration has a Community Dimension if the partici-
pating undertakings pass the turnover33 threshold laid down in
ECUR Artide 1. There are two scenarios- ffist, a concentration has
a Community Dimension if the combined annual worldwide turn-
over of all undertakings concerned exceeds C5 billion ($4.6 billion)
and if the European Community-wide turnover of each of at least
two subsidiaries is more than C250 million ($230 million).34 In the
case of GE/Hone yzvell, this threshold was easily passed.
35
the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, 1994 OJ. (C 385) 1. After
the changes to the ECMR, a Commission Notice on how to identify a full-function
joint venture replaced this notice in 1998. Commission Notice on the Concept of
FuU-Function Joint Ventures under Council Regulation 4064/89 on the Control of
Concentrations Between Undertakings, 1998 O.J. (C 66) 1.
30 These notices are not binding rules but give a very good indication as to
how the Commission will interpret the words in question; it is very unlikely that
the Commission will deviate from its own guidelines. Cf. BELLAMY & CHILD,
COMMON MARKET LAW OF COMPETmON, para. 1-060 (Vivien Rose ed., 4th ed. 1993)
(noting that Commission Notices are for guidance but are not definitive princi-
ples).
31 Commission Notice on the Concept of Concentration Under Council
Regulation 4064/89 EEC on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings,
1998 O.J. (C 66) 5.
32 This was done by the German competition authority, the Bundeskartel-
lamt, in the case of the joint venture Covisint, which did not qualify as a concen-
tration under EC law but was nevertheless a merger within the definition of Ger-
man merger control. See Thomas Horton & Stefan Schmitz, The Lessons of Covisint:
Regulating B2B's Under European and American Competition Laws, 47 WAYNE L. REV.
(forthcoming Apr. 2002).
33 European law uses the word "turnover" which corresponds to "revenues"
in American English.
34 ECMR, supra note 21, art. 1(2)(a)-(b).
35 GE/Honeywell, supra note 7, para. 7.
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The second threshold was introduced in 199736 to control
mergers where a much lower turnover is involved, but the turn-
over is generated by a larger number of companies who are active
in a larger number of Member States.37 In order for a concentration
to have a Community Dimension, more than two-thirds of the
Community-wide turnover of the undertakings concerned may not
be generated in a single Member State ("2/3 rule").38 The ECMR
thus aims at ensuring that only (and, if possible, all) truly "multi-
national mergers" will be dealt with on an EC level, while those
that concern the markets in the Member States will only be as-
sessed by the competent national authorities.S9 For multinational
mergers, the ECMR awards its greatest benefit, the "one-stop-shop
principle," by which it ensures that any other national jurisdiction
36 Council Regulation 1310/97 EC, supra note 29.
37 It provides that for a community dimension, the combined annual world-
wide revenue of all subsidiaries is more than C2.5 billion; plus at least two sub-
sidiaries have an EU Community-wide revenue of more than £100 million; plus
the combined revenue in each of at least three Member States exceeds £-100 mil-
lion; plus in each of at least three of these Member States revenue exceeds E25
million for at least two subsidiaries. ECMR, supra note 21, art. 1(3)(a)-(d).
38 See the last sentences of Article 1(2) and Article 1(3) of the ECMR. EMCR,
supra note 21, art. 1(2)-(3).
39 Many international mergers, whether they are among European companies
or not, are still not reported to the Commission because, they do not reach the
necessary threshold for Community jurisdiction despite their international char-
acter. Therefore, these mergers do not enjoy the one-stop-shop principle and need
to be reported to a number of national authorities instead. As mentioned, of all
the mergers in Europe that required clearance, the Commission was only notified
of about 11%; the rest were reported to one or more national authorities. Merger
control in Europe is therefore far from homogeneous and all encompassing. The
Commission, in its 2000 Report on the application of the Merger Regulation
Thresholds, concluded that too many transactions with significant cross-border
effects, and therefore a Community interest, remain outside of the Community's
merger control rules. Report from the Commission to the Council on the Appli-
cation of the Merger Regulation Thresholds COM(2000)399 final, at 2-3 (June 28,
2000), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/review/. In
order to overcome this shortcoming, the Commission suggests a review of the ex-
isting revenue thresholds as well as other substantive and procedural rules relat-
ing to the control of concentrations, such as the 2/3 rule. It is therefore likely that
either the existing thresholds will be lowered or a completely new threshold cov-
ering certain cross-border concentrations will be introduced. Such a new thresh-
old would be lower than the existing ones and would either be combined with a
modified 2/3 rule or would completely abandon such a rule. The Commission
initiated a comprehensive discussion on the thresholds in its Green Paper on the
Review of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89, COM(2001)745 final (December
11, 2001), available at http://europa.eu.int/comin/competition/mergers/review
[hereinafter ECMR Review Green Paper].
[23:2
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol23/iss2/4
EUROPEAN MERGER CONTROL
within the EC need not be notified of the mergers, no matter how
much effect they may have in these jurisdictions, Of course,
authorities outside the EC may still have to be notified of a merger
but, with just one investigation, the ECMR can grant legal certainty
for the whole of Western Europe.40 By contrast, under the size-of-
the-parties test of the 1Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement
Act of 1976,41 a merger has to be reported if one party has annual
net sales or assets of at least $10 million worldwide and the other
has annual net sales or total assets of at least $100 million. Not
surprisingly, the U.S. authorities receive a much greater number of
notifications every year than the Commission.
42
The question remains of what happens if a merger qualifies as
a concentration within the meaning of ECMR Article 3 but does not
have a Community Dimension. If it does not qualify as a concen-
tration, the Commission may investigate the deal tunder general
competition law. This is not the case if a merger qualifies as a con-
centration but lacks the necessary Community Dimension. For
these cases, ECMR Article 22(1) provides that the Commission
cannot use its powers under Regulation 17.43 As Regulation 17 is
40 It must not be overlooked that the Commission also has jurisdiction in
cases where the European Economic Area ("EEA") is concerned. On May 2,1992,
the EEC, the ECSC, and the then twelve Member States of the European Union
reached an agreement with the European Free Trade Association ("EFTA") States
for the establishment of an EEA that came into force on January 1, 1994 ("EEA-
Treaty"). The aim of this agreement was to create a homogeneous economic area
in Europe, including the states that had not yet joined the European Union. The
agreement also attempted to unify competition law rules. By modeling its own
rules on those of the EC Treaty, the EEA-Treaty effectively extended the EU com-
petition rules to the participating EF17A States. Of the remaining EFTA Members,
only Liechtenstein, Iceland, and Norway participate in the EEA, with Switzerland
abstaining. EEA-Treaty Article 53 was modeled on EC Article 81; EEA-Treaty Ar-
ticle 54 parallels EC Article 82. Most importantly, according to EllA-Treaty Article
57, the rules of the ECMR effectively apply to the EEA. The EEA-Treaty also es-
tablished its own authority, the EFTA Surveillance Authority ("ESA"), and an
EFTA Court However, whenever trade with the EC is affected to an appreciable
extent, the Commission has jurisdiction under the EEA-Treaty (Article 56(I)(c)
and 56(3)).
41 15 U.S.C. § 18(a) (1994).
42 In 2000, the Commission reviewed 345 mergers, while its Washington
counterparts reviewed 4926. Jean Eaglesham & Francesco Guerrera, Brussels
Tougher Than U.S. on Merger Control, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2002, at 9. During this
time, the national authorities within the EU received 3021 notifications.
43 See First Regulation implementing Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 1962
O.J. Sp. Ed. (204/62) 87 [hereinafter Regulation 17] (laying down the procedural
rules and powers of the Commission with regard to European competition law).
2002] 333
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the tool for the administration of EC Articles 81 and 82, the Com-
mission, in fact, cannot use general competition law enshrined in
these provisions to oppose a merger.44 This outcome makes sense
because the ECMR was intended to be the Commission's only tool
for opposing a concentration. To allow a residual competence un-
der general competition law would have negated this principle. It
is also crucial that the parties to a merger know within in a short
period of time and with a maximum degree of certainty whether or
not their plans can be carried out. Allowing residual powers under
Articles EC 81 and 82, which have no time limits, would jeopardize
this aim. 45
2.1.2. Compatibility with the Common Market
The criteria for determining whether or not a concentration is
compatible with the Common Market axe laid down in Article 2
ECMR. This provision emphasizes market dominance, usually as
evidenced by market share. However, as will be seen, European
law does not focus on market share alone. European law also con-
siders other factors and criteria that allow the Commission signifi-
cant room for flexibility.46 In effect, the distinction between the
44 When questioning why the ECMR chose to discontinue applying Regula-
tion 17 rather than, as was clearly intended, EC Articles 81 and 82, one must not
forget that as secondary legislation, the ECMR could not stop applying a piece of
primary legislation such as EC Articles 81 and 82. Hence, it took the detour of
rendering the implementing legislation inapplicable, which brought about the
same effect.
45 There are, however, some general residual powers of the Commission that
can overcome this principle to some extent. Under EC Article 85, the Commission
can still investigate a concentration under the principles of EC Articles 81 and 82
and propose (and ultimately authorize) appropriate measures by which the Mem-
ber States can overcome these infringements. Hence, the Commission retains
some kind of oversight role which, through the assistance of the Member States, it
can use to exercise general competition jurisdiction even in cases where the direct
application of EC Articles 81 and 82 is barred. Aware of the obvious repercus-
sions this possibility offers, the Commission has stated that it would regularly re-
frain from using this power and, in fact, has yet to use it.
46 See Sergio Baches Opi, Merger Control in the United States and European Un-
ion: How Should the United States' Experience Influence the Enforcement of the Council
Merger Regulation?, 6 J. TRANSNAT. L. & PoL'Y 223, 273 (1997) (arguing that the
"commission should, in its merger analysis, equally consider both industrial pol-
icy concerns and strict competition-based factors"); Eric J. Stock, Explaining the
Differing U.S. and EU Positions on the BoeingIMcDonnell-Douglas Merger: Avoiding
Another Near-Miss, 20 U. PA. J. INT'L EcoN. L. 825, 850 (1999) ("The Commission
has used [the] 'significant impediment' test to add some flexibility in the merger
analysis....").
[23:2
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U.S. and the European systems is not as large as the classification
of the ECMR as a market dominance system would suggest.
47
2.1.2.1. The Material Test: Creation or Strengthening of
Dominance in the Relevant Markets
The ways in which the European and U.S. authorities define
the relevant markets do not vary much from each other:48 the
Commission describes the relevant product market as comprising
"all those products and/or services which are regarded as inter-
changeable or substitutable by the consumer, by reason of the
products' characteristics, their prices and their intended use."
49
The relevant product market thus includes those products and
services that a significant number of consumers would accept as a
substitute if the price of the original product were increased ("de-
mand-side substitution") 50 If this price increase prompts consum-
47 Cf. ECMR Review Green Paper, supra note 39, 162 ("[T]he vast majority of
cases dealt with by the Commission and other major jurisdictions using the SLC-
test have revealed a significant degree of convergence in the approach to merger
analysis."); Briggs & Rosenblatt, supra note 13, at 26 (suggesting "that the conflict
has been overdrawn and that while there are certainly differences in the two ju-
risdictions' enabling statutes that yield modest but noticeable differences in law
and policy, the [differences] need not cause lasting conflict between the two anti-
trust regimes").
48 Cf. Thomas Kauper, Merger Control in the United States and the European
Union: Some Observations, 74 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 305, 329 (2000) (noting that there is
little difference between marked definition under the European Merger Regula-
tion and the Clayton Act); David Snyder, Mergers and Acquisitions in the European
Community and the United States: A Movement Toward a Uniform Enforcement Body?,
29 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 115,125-26 (1997) (noting that in both the United States
and the European Community Commission, the determination of the relevant
market depends on "demand-side substitutability").
49 Commission Regulation 447/98 of 1 March 1998 on the Notifications, Time
Limits, and Hearings Provided for in Council Regulation 4064/89 on the Control
of Concentrations Between Undertakings, Section 5, 1998 O.J. (L 61) 1,18 [herein-
after Form C01. See also Case 27/76, United Brands Co. & United Brands Conti-
nental BV v. Commission, 1978 E.C.R. 207, 226 [hereinafter Urited Brands] (de-
fining the relevant product market as all fresh fruits because bananas are
reasonably interchangeable with apples, oranges, and strawberries); Case 6/72,
Europemballage Corp. & Continental Can Co. v. Commission, 1973 E.C.R. 215,
234 Ihereinafter Contintental Can (noting that the relevant product market is de-
termined by a product's interchangeability with other products).
50 The degree of price increases the European Commission used in the so
called SSNIP Test (Small but Significant Non-transitory Increase in Price Test) is
5% to 10%. Commission Notice on the Definition of the Relevant Market for the
Purpose of Community Competition Law, 1997 OJ. (C 372) 5. See also Horizontal
Merger Guidelines 1992, at 1.11, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public
/guidelines/horiz book/hmgl.html (Apr. 2, 1992) [hereinafter Horizontal
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ers to purchase a large enough amount of another product instead,
then both products are considered to be part of the same product
market. In some cases the market may also be considered from the
supply side. If, on short notice, a supplier is able to switch its pro-
duction to supply another good or service to meet demand when
prices rise significantly, the alternative product is to be considered
part of the same product market ("supply-side substitution").,s
Similarly, in the United States, the relevant product market is de-
fined by reference to demand-side substitution.52
The Commission first defines the relevant geographic market
as the areas where the parties to the merger are active.53 A secon-
dary definition is provided by the area in which the above-
mentioned substitution could take place: where the conditions of
competition are sufficiently homogeneous and can be distin-
guished from neighboring areas because conditions there are con-
siderably different.5 4 In the United States, the geographic market is
defined as the area in which the seller operates and to which buy-
ers can practicably turn for supplies 5-
With regard to the material test for whether a merger will be
allowed, ECMR Article 2(2) states that a concentration which does
not create or strengthen market dominance (hence "MD test"),
whereby effective competition would be significantly impeded in
the common market or in a substantial part of it, shall be declared
Merger Guidelines 19921 ('The Agency at times may use a price increase that is
larger or smaller than five percent.").
51 Case 6/72, Continental Can, supra note 49, at 248.
52 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Serv., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 481-82
(1992) (stating that the relevant market for antitrust purposes is determined by the
"commercial realities" faced by consumers); Horizontal Merger Guidelines 1992,
supra note 50, at 1.1 ("[T]he Agency will delineate the product market to be a
product or group of products such that a hypothetical profit-maximizing firm that
was the only present and future seller of those products likely would impose at
least 'a small but significant and nontransitory' increase in price.").
53 Case IV/3151, Magill TV Guide/ITP, BBC and RTE v. Commission, 1989
O.J. (L 78) 43; Case IV/29877, British Telecomm. v. Commission, 1982 O.J. (L 360)
36.
54 Case lV/M.1069, WorldCom/MCI v. Commission, 1999 O.J. (L 116) 1,
para. 802.
55 Horizontal Merger Guidelines 1992, supra note 50, at 1.2. See also United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 359 (1963) (noting that the relevant
geographic market is determined by the area where the seller operates and the
buyer can turn for supplies); T. Harris Young & Assoc. v. Marquette Elec., Inc.,
931 F.2d 816, 823 (11th Cir. 1991) ("The geographic dimension is the area in which
the product or its reasonably interchangeable substitutes are traded.").
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compatlile with the common market. In contrast, Article 2(3)
ECMR, as a quasi-mirror image to ECMR Article 2(2),56 prescribes
that a concentration which does create or strengthen a dominant
position whereby effective competition would be significantly im-
peded in the common market or in a substantial part of it, shall be
declared incompatible with the common market. It is in this sub-
stantive test that European merger control differs significantly
from its U.S. counterpart: U.S. law asks whether a merger will sub-
stantially lessen competition ("SLC test").5 7
The different approach to what seems to be an identical prob-
lem is the result of different historical development in Europe and
the United States. Rather than engaging in a long historical tractate
on the history of competition law in general and merger control in
particular, for the purpose of this Article it suffices to state that
current Emopean merger control is to a lage extent based on the
German concept of competition law and German law, in turn, has
been largely influenced by the so-called ordoliberal schools of
thought.58 Originally, it was believed that every individual should
enjoy economic freedom as part of his political freedom and that,
therefore, competition should be completely free from any form of
government interference.5 9 However, this belief was based on the
assumption that individuals competed with one another60 - as was
the case in the early- to mid-eighteenth century. The Industrial
Revolution in the late-nineteenth century brought this situation to
an end because the market became more and more the playing
field of large entities. These entities sometimes became so strong
that competitors were driven out of the market and effective com-
56 It is surprising that both provisions were adopted since one or the other
alone would have sufficed.
57 Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat 730, 731-32 (1914) (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 18 (1994)).
53 DAVID J. GERBER, LAW AND COMPETITION IN TwtETIT CENTURY EUROPE -
PROTECTING PROMETHEUS 232-66 (2001) [hereinafter PROMETHEUS]; David J. Gerber,
Constitutionalizing the Economy: German Neo-liberalism, Competition Law and the
"New" Europe, 42 Am. 1. CoNT. L, 25 (1994).
59 Gerber, AM. J. CoMP. L., supra note 58, at 36; Barry Rodger, Competition Pol-
icy, Liberalism and Globalization: A European Perspective, 6 COLUM. J. EuR. L. 289, 293
(2000). See also ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS (R.H. Campbell et al. eds, Oxford Univ. Press 1976) (1776)
(arguing that the competitive interaction of free individuals seeking personal gain
produces wealth).
60 PROMETHEUS, supra note 58, at 23.
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petition was eliminated.61 German ordoliberals therefore propa-
gated a system where the market players would freely compete
with each other, while the State would guarantee and provide for
an order or constitution according to which such competition is
and remains possible. Part of this order is the control and restric-
tion of overly powerful single entities.62 This approach was
adopted in Germany after World War II in its first competition
law.63 This competition law and thinking later also found their
way into the ECMR. 64 Based on the idea of an order where com-
petitors should be protected from overwhelming players, both the
German 65 and the European system ask whether or not a merger
will lead to the creation of a dominant position.
Interestingly, and quite contrary to its later development, the
original development in the United States was not very different
from. that in Europe. In America, concerns also grew about the
rising power of giant combinations called trusts-Standard Oil
being one of the most prominent among them. 66 The Sherman Act
61 Another danger to competition was the increasing formation of cartels as a
response to the economic crises in the late eighteenth century.
62 Donna Patterson & Carl Shapiro, Transatlantic Divergence in GE/Honeywell:
Causes and Lessons, 16 ANTITRUST 18, 20 (2001), argue that the European caution
towards large entities "appears dangerously close to the... 'Big is Bad' doctrine
from the 1960s" and has no sound economic basis.
b3 Yor an overview of the development of German competition law and its
relation to the ordoliberal school of thought, see PROMETHEUS, supra note 58, at
266-94.
64 To a large extent, today's European antitrust policy is based on the German
model. See David Gerber, AM. J. COMP. L., supra note 58, at 71-74; Rodger, supra
note 59, at 306. One consequence of this influence has been the prominent role of
German competition lawyers in the administration of European competition law.
After the establishment of the EC, the Directorate General responsible for Compe-
tition has been led primarily by a German national: of the six Directors General
since 1958, five have been German. The last German to hold this post, Alexander
Schaub, will soon be moved from his post as part of a general rotation of high
level officials who have held the post for more than seven years. In a departure
from German dominance, he is likely to be succeeded by an Englishman.
65 Section 36(l) of the Restraints Against Competition Act ("GWB") states
that a merger has to be prohibited if it can be expected to create or strengthen a
dominant position. Uniquely, the GWB gives clear levels of market share above
which one or several competitors are deemed to be dominant, i.e., one-third for
one competitor, one-half for three or fewer competitors, and two-thirds for five or
fewer competitors.
66 See generally Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 30-46
(1910).
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was enacted in response to these concerns.67 Hence, and in con-
trast to the European model, U.S. law focuses on the structure of
the market by asking if the merger, independent of whether or not
it creates a dominant position of a single entity, will lead to a de-
mise in competition in that market.6s In U.S. antitrust law the po-
sition of the individual entity is only considered as evidence of the
concentration of the market. Market concentration is the starting
point in a merger control investigation in the United States
69 -just
like the Market Dominance of one competitor is the starting con-
sideration in Europe-and then the anticompetitive effect of a
merger is analyzed. Although in many instances, both tests should
arrive at the same result, it is possible that the same merger could
be illegal in Europe and perfectly legal in the United States or vice
versa.70
Not surprisingly, the schism between the different systems of
merger control is not limited to the EU and the United States.
Rather it can be seen all over the world with countries, depending
on their historical and political affiliation, basically following one
system or the other. The SLC test has been adopted in Australia,71
67 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HSTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 463 (2d ed. 1985)
(stating that the act was in response only to trusts). However, merger control was
soon regulated by a special instrument the Clayton Act See supra note 57.
63 Kauper, supra note 48, at 320; Stock, supra note 46, at 833.
69 The 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines assess concentration in accordance
with the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index ("HHI"). The HH1 examines the relation-
ship between the number of competitors and their respective market share in or-
der to determine how concentrated a market is and what change in the index will
occur through a merger. The HHII is calculated by summing the squares of the
market shares of each firm in the market A market dominated by few competi-
tors with high market shares leads to a high HFI, indicating a highly concentrated
market, whereas many competitors with relatively small market shares will lead
to a low HHI, indicating a low level of concentration. The Guidelines create a
presumption of illegality in cases where the HHI is increased by more than 100
points in markets of 1800 and above, or legality if the HEI is below 1000, or be-
tween 1000 and 1800 and the increase is less than 100. Horizontal Merger Guide-
lines 1992, supra note 50, at 1.51.
70 Under the SLC test a merger may be illegal even though-in European
terms-it does not create or strengthen a dominant position. Conversely, the SLC
test may let a merger proceed even though, in terms of European law, a dominant
position is gained.
71 Trade Practices Act, 1974, c. 50 (Austl.) (as amended 1993).
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New Zealand (which only very recently moved from a MD to a
SLC test),72 Canada,7 and South Africa.74 In the United Kingdom,
the legality of a merger is currently decided with regard to possible
detriment to the public interest,75 although in practice, the over-
whelming majority of cases are decided, as in the United States, on
competition grounds.76 The current U.K. system is scheduled to be
properly replaced by a U.S.-style SLC test.77 In contrast, most of
the other European national systems have been brought in line
with the ECMR and follow the MD approach. 78 The same is true
for most countries that are in line for membership to the European
Union.79
2.1.2.1.1. Market Share
The ECMR (or for that matter any other EC document) does not
contain a clear-cut definition of what constitutes a dominant posi-
tion. For its assessment, the Commission relies on the established
case law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities
("ECJ") and EC Article 82 which prohibits the abuse of a dominant
position 80 and thus parallels Section 2 of the Sherman Act.81 Ac-
72 Commerce Act, 1986, c. 47, amended by Commerce Amendment Act (No. 2),
2001 (N.Z.).
7 Competition Act, R.S.C., ch. C-34, § 92 (1985) (Can.).
74 § 12A of the Competition Act 89 of 1998.
75 Fair Trading Act, 1973, c. 84 (Eng.).
76 WHISH, supra note 22, at 730.
77 See U.K. Department of Trade and Industry, Mergers: A Consultation Docu-
ment on Proposals for Reform (1999), available at http://www.dti.gov.uk.cp
/mergercon/ (discussing governance proposals for reform of the merger regime);
U.K. Department of Trade and Industry, Mergers: The Response to the Consultation
on Proposals for Reform (Oct. 2000), available at http://www.dti.gov.uk.cp
/mergers/. A similar step is contemplated in the Republic of Ireland.
78 Italy, the Netherlands, Finland, and Sweden follow the European approach
as well. France combines the U.S. and European approaches by asking whether
the concentration will negatively affect competition, particularly by creating or
reinforcing a dominant position. See Law No. 2001-420 of May 15, 2001, J.O. May
16, 2001 p. 7776, art. 92 (inserting Article L 430-6 to the Commercial Code), avail-
able at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/html/framecodesl.htm.
79 ECMR Review Green Paper, supra note 39, para. 161.
80 Opi, supra note 46, at 272; Stock, supra note 46, at 845.
81 This parallel must not be overemphasized since Section 2 of the Sherman
Act requires a monopoly, whereas EC Article 82 lets a dominant position suffice.
Cf. Kauper, supra note 48, at 321 ("The threshold for finding a dominant position
under [current Article 82] may be significantly lower than the measures of mo-
nopoly power under section two of the Sherman Act.").
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cording to the ECJ, the test to determine a dominant position is
whether the economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking enables
it to "prevent effective competition being maintained on the rele-
vant market by affording it the power to behave, to an appreciable
extent, independently of its competitors, customers, and ultimately
its consumers."82 This adoption of EC Article 82 is not without
problems because the case law of the ECJ regarding this provision
deals with the existing position of an undertaking in the market and
whether or not this position is dominant and being abused. In
contrast, the merger investigation is concerned with the position
that arises through a merger and the question of whether it will cre-
ate or strengthen a dominant position. Since it is not known how a
proposed merger will actually evolve, this assessment necessarily
involves a large degree of speculation.83
The most important factor, but by no means the only one, in
determining whether or not a dominant position exists, is market
share. In order to determine whether a merger should proceed, the
Commission must consider the market share that would be created
by the merger. Again, neither under EC Article 82 nor in the
ECMR are there hard and fast rules for the level of market share
the Commission uses to identify market dominance. 84 The ECMR
itself states that a combined market share of 25% should, in all
likelihood, not impede effective competition 8 and is thus to be re-
garded as compatible with the Common Market. In a number of
cases the Commission held that market shares between 50% and
82 United Brands, supra note 49, at 286. The court used the same formula in
Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v. Commission, 1979 E.C.R. 461 (1979)
[hereinafter Hoffmann-La Roche].
3 Cf. Baker, supra note 1, at 579. This is also true for the SLC approach and
reflects the general situation of merger control which is based on an ex-ante ap-
praisal.
94 In comparison, for example, German merger control rules provide for a re-
buttable presumption of dominance if one competitor has a market share of more
than one-third, or two or three competitors have a share of more than one half, or
four or five have a tvo-thixds market share. In the United Kingdom, an under-
taking with a market share of more than one half is presumed to be dominant Cf-
Monti, supra note 12, at 3 (noting that the EU Commission does not use any par-
ticular concentration ratio to establish presumptions).
85 ECMR, supra note 21, no. 15, pmbl. Apart from the fact that the wording of
this provision seems to suggest that the 25% threshold should not be regarded as
a firm threshold, it must also be remembered that the recitals are not legally
binding, but rather are merely to be used for interpreting the regulation.
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60% were incompatible with the Common Market.86 The Commis-
sion has also ruled that, under certain circumstances, a share of as
low as 44% was incompatible. 87 On the other hand, the Commis-
sion has granted permission to proceed to a company that had a
market share of more than 80%.88 Over the years, an unofficial and
prima facie level of 40% market share has been identified as the
threshold for dominance. 89
This emphasis on market share in the assessment of a dominant
position is problematic. To begin with, it is questionable whether
the market share figures of one company can simply be added to
that of another after or because of the merger.90 Difficulties in im-
plementing the merger may result in some of this share being lost
to competitors. The decision to block a merger could thus quickly
be overtaken by events that, ex post, render the decision wrong. If
the European system were based solely on market share, this
would constitute a fatal weakness. However, in almost all cases,
market share is only the starting point. The Commission looks at
various other factors for establishing market dominance. Market
share alone is sufficient to establish market dominance in only a
few cases. The most obvious case is a market share of 100%, which
would put the incumbent in a position to act completely independ-
ently of customers and competitors.
The aforementioned problems have also played a role in the
discussion in the United States, where they led to a demise of the
importance of the market share of the individual party in analyz-
ing mergers.91 In 1974, the Supreme Court in United States v. Gen-
eral Dynamics Corp. held that the statistical data about the market
86 See, e.g., Case IV/M.553, RTL/Veronica/Endemol, 1996 O.J. (L 134) 32;
Case IV/M.856, British Telecom/ MCI (II), 1997 O.J. (L 336) 1.
87 Case IV/M.754, Anglo American Corp./Lonrho, 1998 O.J. (L 149) 21.
88 Case IV/M.042, Alcatel/Telettra, 1991 O.J. (L 122) 48.
89 See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, XXIXth REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 4-5
(1999); Barry E. Hawk et al., Recent Developments in EU Merger Control, 15
ANTITRUST 24 (2001). Interestingly, in United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374
U.S. 321, 364 (1963), the Supreme Court found that a 30% market share was suffi-
cient to give rise to the presumption of illegality. The 1992 Horizontal Merger
Guidelines assume that adverse unilateral price effects are most likely to occur
when the parties to a merger have a market share of at least 35%. Horizontal
Merger Guidelines 1992, supra note 50, at 2.211.
90 Moreover, this type of addition can only be done in cases where the merg-
ing parties are active in horizontal markets. Market share necessarily plays a
much less prominent role in cases of vertical mergers.
91 Kauper, supra note 48, at 323.
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and market shares relied upon by the government were not con-
clusive indicators of anti-competitive effects92-thus effectively
killing the market share presumption for illegality.93 Only a fur-
ther examination of the particular market-its structure, history,
and probable future-can provide the appropriate setting for
judging the probable anti-competitive effect of the merger.
In contrast, the Commission does not regard a high market
concentration as a major factor against a merger, although this
factor will be taken into account when determining the (relative)
strength of an entity, which depends on the number and strength
of its competitors. Hence, the Commission may allow a merger
that leaves only three competitors active in a market, provided
these competitors have a comparable market share. In the United
States, such a merger would probably be prohibited as an anti-
competitive oligopoly. At the same time, a merger which creates a
dominant position within the meaning of European law, might get
approval in the United States in a little concentrated market.
2.1.2.1.2. Mandatory Factors
When assessing if a merger is compatible with the Common
Market, Article 2(1) ECMR prescribes that the Commission shall
take into account the following mandatory factors: (a) the need to
maintain and develop effective competition within the common
market in view of, among other things, the structure of all the mar-
kets concerned and the actual or potential competition from un-
dertakings located either inside or outwith the Community; (b) the
market position of the undertakings concerned and their economic
and financial power, the alternatives available to suppliers and us-
ers, their access to supplies or markets, any legal or other barriers
to entry, supply and demand trends for the relevant goods and
services, the interests of the intermediate and ultimate consumers,
and the development of technical and economic progress provided
that it is to the consumers' advantage and does not form an obsta-
cle to competition.94
While it seems that ECMR Article 2(1)(b) merely reiterates gen-
eral concerns of merger control to consider as a matter of course,
the factors in (b) are more specific and require careful attention. It
92 United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486,498 (1974).
93 Cf. Kauper, supra note 48, at 323.
94 ECMR, supra note 21, art. 2(1).
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is not completely clear how these criteria can be applied to the ac-
tual decision making process and particularly how they relate to
the criterion for establishing the impediment to competition. Since
the factors must be considered when appraising compatibility with
the Common Market and not merely when assessing the dominant
position or the impediment to competition, it would appear that
these factors must be applied after the aforementioned criteria are
met. However, in practice, these factors are mostly used to estab-
lish dominance, as was the case in GE/Honeywell.
Previous case law suggests that the Commission has empha-
sized certain aspects like superior technology,95 access to capital,
96
vertical integration, a well-developed distribution system,97 prod-
uct differentiation, 98 overall size and strength,99 conduct 00 and per-
formance'l and has been less concerned with other aspects. There
has also been emphasis on the general structure of the markets in-
volved. 02 This aspect can lead to the result that in one case a fig-
ure of market share can be harmless whereas in another case the
same figure leads to market dominance, 03 based on the number of
competitors and their market shares. 04 In its decision to establish
dominance in GE/Honeywell, the Commission went to great lengths
in addressing the issues of access to capital, vertical integration,
overall size and strength, and previous conduct. As already men-
tioned, it did not do so under a separate heading, but in its overall
assessment, together with the questions of dominance and im-
pediment to competition.
Interesting, and of importance in the case of GE/Honeywell, is
the issue of the interests of intermediate and ultimate consumers as
95 Case 322/81, NV Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie Michelin v. Commis-
sion, 1983 E.C.R. 3461, 3536, 1 C.M.L.R. 282 (1985) [hereinafter Michelin]; United
Brands, supra note 49, at 276.
96 Case IV/M.6.72R, Continental Can Co. v. Commission, 1972 J.O. (L7) 25,
[1972] C.M.L.R. Dl.
97 Hoffmann-La Roche, supra note 82, at 524; United Brands, supra note 49, at
276.
98 United Brands, supra note 49, at 276.
9 Miche hn, supra nolte 95, at 3536.
100 United Brands, supra note 49, at 277.
101 Commission, Decision IV/F-3/33.708, British Sugar, art. 85, 1999 O.J. (L
76)1.
102 Michelin, supra note 95, at 3461.
103 WHISH, supra note 22, at 155f.
104 See supra note 69.
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laid down in ECMR Article 2(1)(b). It is often claimed that the con-
sumer's interest is not accorded any weight in EC competition law
and it is true that in practice this provision has had no relevance. 105
This does not mean that under European merger control, the inter-
ests of the consumer are of no concern to the competition authori-
ties;106 but is it true that they are not the immediate focus. As dis-
cussed above, European merger control aims to prevent entities
from becoming dominant or increasing their dominance through a
merger. This is a rather strict approach and does not leave much
room for considerations not connected with the position of the en-
tities. Consequently, European law also does not provide for con-
sideration of possible efficiencies that can be the result of a
merger.107 This is another huge difference from the United States
where the so-called efficiency defense would, under certain cir-
cumstances, allow a merger if it leads to improvements (e.g., lowel
prices for consumers). 08 The lack of an efficiency defense was one
of the key (and most vigorous) criticisms against the Commission's
105 Cf. Heinz F. L6ffler, FKVO Artikel 2, in 1 KOMMENTAR ZUM DEUTSCHEN UND
EUROPAISCHEN KARTELLRECHT 165 (Eugen Langen & Hermann-Josef Bunte eds.,
9th ed. 2001); Opi, supra note 46, at 231 ("Thus despite the Merger Regulation's
reference to consumers' interests, in practice, these interests are rarely taken into
account.").
106 Briggs & Rosenblatt, supra note 13, at 30.
107 Cf. Thomas L. Greaney, Not for Import: Mhy the EU Should Not Adopt the
American Efficiency Defense for Analyzing Merger and joint Ventures, 44 ST. Louis L.I.
871, 889 (2000). Citing Case WV/M.53, Aerospatiale-Alenia/de Havilland, 1991
Oj. (L 334) 42, 4 C.M.L.R. M2 (1992), Case lV/M.469, MSG Media Services, 1994
O.J. (L 364) 1, and citing "other Commission decisions" that take efficiency im-
provements into account "between the lines," Greaney argues that "efficiencies
have played a negligible role in European analyses." However, in both de Havil-
land and MSG, the Commission did not allow efficiency considerations to change
the outcome of the decision if a dominant position is created or strengthened. Cf.
Kauper, supra note 48, at 350.
103 DOJ/FTC Merger Guidelines expressly recognize that efficiencies are
worthy of strong consideration in approving substantial increases of concentra-
tion, and several lower courts have concurred. The U.S. Supreme Court most re-
cently said that the possibility that efficiencies will result from a proposed merger
cannot be used as a defense to illegality in Clayton Act Section 7 merger cases. See
FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 'U.S. 568, 58D (1967). Yurthermore, the Court
has stated that where the effect of a merger "may be substantially to lessen com-
petition [it] is not saved because, on some ultimate reckoning of social or eco-
nomic debits and credits, it may be deemed beneficial." United States v. Philadel-
phia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 371 (1963). Attempts to pronounce the Supreme
Court's reasoning as disproved or outdated minimize the inexorable waxing and
waning of the diametrically opposed socioeconomic belief systems through the
decades.
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position in GE/Honeywell. 0 9 Since the Commission could not have
recognized this defense even if it had wanted to, this criticism is di-
rected less against this particular decision and more against the
system itself-the criticism being that the system does not provide
for an efficiency-defense like U.S. law does.
2.1.2.2. Significant Impediment to Competition
From the wording of ECMR Article 2(2) and (3) it follows that
ECMR Article 2 effectively calls for a two-tier test to determine
whether or not a merger is compatible with the Common Market:
dominant position test and the significant impediment to competi-
tion test. It has been argued-mostly by German writers-that the
impediment to competition is a natural consequence of the first
(and thus only) test of dominant market position, and therefore has
no substance of its own. The Commission, however, seems to
follow a two-tier approach. In Aerospatiale -Alenia/de Havilland,"'
it stated that:
[A] concentration which leads to the creation of a dominant
position may however be compatible with the common
109 Patterson & Shapiro, supra note 62, at 21.
110 L6ffler, supra note 105, 1jj 9, 174; Ulrich Immenga, FKVO Artikel 2, in
KOMMENTAR ZUM EUROPAISCHEN KARTELLRECHT, 18 (Urich Immenga & Ernst-
Joachim Mestmacker eds., 2nd ed., 1997). The Bundeskartellamt also appears to
subscribe to this view. See Bundeskartellamt, Prohibition Criteria in Merger Control-
Dominant Position Versus Substantial Lessening of Competition? (Antitrust Work-
shop, Discussion Paper, Oct. 8 -9, 2001, available at http://www
.bundeskartellamt'de/discussion.papers.html. In contrast, Anglo-Saxon lawyers
in Europe favor the existence of a two-tier test that would bring European law
closer to U.S. law. See WHISH, supra note 22, at 773; BELLAMY & CHILD, supra note
30, para. 6-062 (noting that applying the second tier of the test would introduce "a
degree of flexibility to the Commission's appraisal which would be lacking if it
were required solely to apply the dominance test"); Stock, supra note 46, at 850
("The commision has used [the] 'significant impediment test to add some flexibil-
ity in the merger analysis .. '); C.J. COOK & C.S. KERSE, EC Merger Control 128-
29 (3d ed. 2000) ("The requirement that the dominant position must significantly
impede competition in practice is a two-part composite test, and is a formulation
broadly consistent with exititng case law under Article 82"); AuSON JONES &
BRENDA SMITH, EC COMPETITION LAW 752 (2001) (arguing strongly for a two-tier
test). Interestingly, the German government also argued for the existence of a
second criterion in the Kali und Salz case. E.C.J., Cases C-68/94 & 30/95, French
Republic v. Commission (Kali und Salz), 1998 E.C.R. 1-1375, T 106, [1998] 4
C.M.L.R. 829 (1990) [hereinafter Kali und Salz].
111 Case IV/M.053, Aerospatiale-Alenia/de Havilland v. Commission, 1991
O.J. (L 334) 42, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. M2.
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market within the meaning of Article 2(2) of the Merger
Regulation if there exists strong evidence that this position
is only temporary and would be quickly eroded because of
high probability of strong market entry.112
In MCI WorldCom/Sprint, which was the first U.S. merger
stopped from being implemented, the Commission first identified
the dominant position and then continued by expressly asking
what the impact of the merger would be on competition."
3
The E.C.J also seems to have subscribed to this view. In Kali
und Salz, the court acknowledged the existence of a second test by
saying that:
[Tihe introduction of that criterion is intended to ensure
that the existence of a causal link between the concentration
and the deterioration of the competitive structure of the
market can be excluded only if the competitive structure re-
sulting from the concentration would deteriorate in similar
fashion even if the concentration did not proceed."
4
Therefore, apart from the question of dominance, the Commis-
sion has to address three further aspects. First, it has to establish
that competition is negatively affected by the existence of a domi-
nant position. Secondly, a causal link must exist between the
negative effect and the dominant position. This approach would
bring European law closer to the SLC test applied in U.S. law by
emphasizing the actual impact on competition by a merger rather
than letting the existence of market dominance decide."5 It would
112 Id. para. 53. In other words, the fact that market dominance had been es-
tablished was not sufficient to prohibit the merger. A similar decision was made
in Case IV/M.222, Mannesmann/Hoesch v. Commission, 1993 O.J. (L 114) 34.
113 MCI WorldCom/Sprint, supra note 5, para.129-74. The parties had actu-
ally argued before the FCC that the merger would have no impact on competition
in which case, according to the two-tier approach, the Commission would have
cleared the merger. However, the Conimission did not accept *s argument as it
consequently denied clearance.
114 Kali und Salz, supra note 110, para. 115.
115 One way of bringing both systems closer together, an issue which will be
discussed in more detail infra at Section 5 of this Article, would thus be for Euro-
pean law to accept or strengthen the second criterion. European law would still
not be identical to U.S. law because the requirement of market dominance would
still be a high threshold to pass in order to get to the question of impediment to
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also give the Commission more flexibility to deal with mergers,
since market dominance alone does not automatically render a
merger impossible.1 6 When determining the question of conse-
quences, the Commission, like the U.S. authorities, has more lee-
way as to which aspects to emphasize (and which to base the deci-
sion on). In that respect, European merger control is actually not
very different from its U.S. counterpart-the main difference being
that the Europeans have to establish market dominance first, with-
out which no merger could be stopped. Thirdly, the impediment
to competition must be significant. This introduces a de minimis
rule that would allow for small infringements and give the Com-
mission yet more flexibility in its decisions.
In the case of GE/Honeywvell, the question whether the substan-
tive test under the ECMR is one- or two-tiered played, or should
have played, an important part. Adhering to the two-tier test, the
Commission, after having established market dominance, should
have continued by showing that the proposed merger would bring
about anti-competitive effects.117 The steps the Commission took in
this case were less straight forward: instead of first establishing
dominance under one heading and then assessing the question of
impediment of competition under another, the Commission ad-
dressed both aspects together and also included in its assessment
the mandatory factors that will be outlined next.
2.2. The European Merger Control Process
The Commission is the executive authority within the EU and
in that role also bears responsibility for all antitrust matters."8 The
individual powers of the Commission resemble those of any com-
competition, but it would bring the main substantive tests of both systems closer
together. Not surprisingly, it is the Common Lawyers in Europe who advocate
the importance of the second criterion because it would bring European law closer
to the model applied in the United States and many other Common Law coun-
tries.
116 Stock, supra note 46, at 850.
117 GE/Honeywell, supra note 7, para. 341.
118 Within the Commission, it is the Directorate General IV ("DG IV"), or
more precisely, the Merger Task Force ("MTF") within DG IV, which conducts
merger oversight and which is the authority to which all correspondence should
be sent.
[23:2
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol23/iss2/4
EUROPEAN MERGER CONTROL
petent national authority." 9 Under ECMR Article 11, the Commis-
sion may request information from the undertakings concerned,
from third parties or from national authorities. 20 Failure to pro-
vide the requested information can result in the imposition of fines.
Like national competition authorities, the Commission also has
wide investigative powers. ECMR Article 13 states that the Com-
mission may examine the books and other records, it may take or
demand copies thereof, it may ask for explanations, and, most im-
portantly, it may enter premises, land, and means of transportation
of undertakings.12' In a number of circumstances, the Commission
may impose fines on the parties to a merger. The most important
instance is if the parties fail to notify the Commission and imple-
ment the merger anyway. 22 Fines may range from £1000 to
£50,000 for failure to notify a concentration or for submitting false
or misleading infornation.23 If the parties disregard a decision by
the Commission and implement a concentration when it was de-
clared incompatible with the Common Market, the Commission
may impose fines of up to 10% of the aggregate revenue of the un-
dertakings concerned.124 In the eleven years since the EMCR en-
tered into force, fines have been imposed in only five cases. 25
119 These powers were modeled after those given to the Commission under
general competition law as laid down in Regulation 17. Regulation 17, supra note
43.
120 For an overview of the procedure of EC competition law, see MARTIN
SMIT, COMPETITION LAW, ENFORCEMENT AND PROCEDURE (2001).
121 Article 13 ECMR parallels, almost to the word, Article 14 of Regulation 17.
122 Furthermore, fines may be imposed for late notification, and for providing
false or misleading information. After the notification process has been finalized,
the Commission may also impose fines for breach of any conditions attached to a
clearance. Third parties may also be fined if they fail to supply the Commission
with requested information.
123 ECMR, supra note 21, art 14(1).
124 Id. art. 14(2).
12 It was not until 1998 that the Commission first imposed a fine under the
ECMR. Samsung acquired control over an American firm and failed to notify the
Commission, whereupon it was fined C33,000. Commission Decision Imposing
Fines for Failing to Notify and for Putting into Effect a Concentration in Breach of
Article 4(1) and Article 7(1) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89,1999 Oj. (L
225) 12.
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For the purpose of the notification, the parties 26 must 27 com-
plete and submit Form CO, which is less like a form and more like
a very complex series of questions.128 Because of the emphasis on
market dominance, a substantial part of Form CO is devoted to the
market affected.129 Parties are asked to define the relevant product
and geographical markets, to describe the structure and market
entry situation, give information about their own market shares
and that of their competitors, explain the degree of vertical inte-
gration of the competitors, etc. 30 This process differs from the U.S.
system where the parties for a filing under Hart-Scott-Rodino
Act'3 ' have to submit much less information and, in particular, do
not have to concem themselves with the position of competitors. 32
The information obtained in Form CO helps the Commission to
gather the information necessary to make its decision. This also
126 It should be noted that according to Article 4(2) ECMR it is generally the
responsibility of all of the parties to a merger to jointly notify the Commission.
However, in the most common case of a takeover, it is the responsibility of the
party acquiring control to notify the Commission. EMCR, supra note 21, art. 4(2).
127 There are exceptions to this rule. Under Article 21(3) ECMR the Member
States may take measures to protect legitimate interests and thereby prevent the
filing. For example, the Commission has accepted representations by the U.K.
and Italy that their industries were ordered not to notify the Commission of
agreements concerning the arms trade. Id. art. 21(3).
128 Form CO, supra note 49, asks very detailed questions regarding the parties
involved, the relevant market, the shares of the market players, access of new
players, etc. The Commission invites the parties to a merger to contact it to dis-
cuss the merger at a very early stage. During these discussions the Commission
may waive some of the questions in Form CO, because, for example, it does not
consider the information necessary for decision making or it is already aware of
the facts. See also European Commission, "Mergers: Best Practice Guidelines,"
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/others/best_
practice-gl.html (last visited February 24, 2002) ("[IUt may not be necessary to
provide all information specified in Form CO [but] all requests to omit... infor-
mation specified should be discussed ... with the Merger Task Force before-
hand.").
129 See Opi, supra note 46, at 248.
130 In practice, preparing a Form CO questionnaire requires a substantial
amount of time and effort, not only (and maybe even less by) lawyers and man-
agement, but also by market researchers and economists. It is usual practice that
the parties submit drafts of the Form and discuss it with the MTF before submit-
ting the final version.
131 15 U.S.C. § 18(a) (1994).
132 Under HCR the parties do have to turn over documents analyzing mar-
kets, market share, etc., and do have to provide information on the products, to
which the government gives specified codes. This lets the government take a first
cut at calculating concentrations. Id.
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poses a considerable degree of ambiguity, since this initial material
is provided by the parties and not by independent bodies. 33
EC merger control provides for pre-merger notification, that is,
the merger must not be implemented before it has received clear-
ance from the Commission.134 After receiving notification,135 the
Commission has one month for a first assessment, to investigate
the merger. This period may, under certain circumstances, be ex-
133 This does not mean that this information is not checked and supple-
mented by independent sources. However, it has been criticized in that unlike the
United States DOJ and Federal Trade Commission, the Commission does not have
sufficient input from economists, especially in-house. See Professor Carl Sha-
piro's comments in Roundtable Discussion, 16 ANInTRUST 7, 17 (2001) [hereinafter
Roundtable Discussion].
134 The Commission has set out the details of the notification progress as well
as the questions of hearings prior to the decision in a regulation. Commission
Regulation (EC) 447/98,1998 O.J. (L 061) 1. A number of mergers appear to have
no impact on the markets cornemed. This is either because the parties have not
been active in the same markets before, or because their combined market share is
so minute that no negative effect is expected. Under these circumstances it would
be inappropriate to apply the same strict rules as those used for complex mergers.
In view of this, the Commission has devised a simplified procedure for routine
concentrations that came into force since September 1, 2000. Commission Notice
on a Simplified Procedure for Treatment of Certain Concentrations under Council
Regulation 4064/89 EEC of 29 July 2000, 2000 O.J. (C 217) 32. The simplified pro-
cedure will be applied to concentrations where two or more undertakings acquire
joint control of a joint venture, where none of the parties to a concentration are
engaged in business activities in the same product and geographical market or
where the combined market share is not 15% or more for horizontal and 25% for
vertical relationships. Additionally, the revenue of the joint venture and/or the
revenue of the contributed activities must be less than E100 million in the Euro-
pean Economic Area ("EEA") territory and the total value of assets transferred to
the Joint Venture must be less than E100 million in the EEA territory. If the Com-
mission is satisfied that the concentration qualifies for the simplified procedure, it
will normally issue a short-form decision. The concentration will thus be declared
compatible with the Common Market within one month of the notification. How-
ever, if the Commission finds that the notified merger should be investigated in
depth, the Commission has the option to revert into a normal Phase I procedure.
Between September 2000 and April 2001, some 216 mergers were notified to the
Commission under the ECMR. About 39% of these were considered to fall under
the provisions of the simplified treatment procedure. The average duration from
notification to clearance in these cases was twenty-five calendas days. See ECMR
Review Green Paper, supra note 39, para. 175.
135 According to Article 4(1) ECMR, the Commission must be notified of the
merger not more than one week after the conclusion of the agreement, which means
that the parties must have a binding agreement in their hands when filing the no-
tification. However, it is standard practice-and encouraged-to seek contact
with the Commission at a much earlier stage in order to discuss pertinent details
of the merger and try to resolve problematic issues before formal notification.
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tended.136 At the end of this stage ("Phase I"), the Commission
must either declare the merger to be compatible with the Common
Market (Article 6(1)(b) decision) or, if it finds that it has serious
doubts that the merger is compatible with the Common Market, it
may open an in-depth investigation (Article 6(1)(c) decision)237 for
which it has another four months ("Phase II"). 138 Only about 5% of
all notifications reach this stage. At the end of Phase II, the Com-
mission must declare the merger compatible (Article 8(2) deci-
sion)139 or incompatible (Article 8(3) decision) with the Common
Market. If the Commission fails to make any decision after Phase I
or, if applicable, after Phase II, the merger is deemed to be com-
patible with the Common Market (ECMR Article 10(6)). It is im-
portant to recognize that the time limits for evaluating mergers
may be extended or may not even begin to run if the parties submit
incomplete' 40 or incorrect information,141 or if the Commission re-
quests substantial additional information.
Unlike the U.S. system, where the authorities have to take the
parties of a proposed merger to court to stop it, the Commission's
decision has the power of an administrative act' 42-as it is the deci-
136 Where undertakings are given by the parties, the time period in which the
Commission must complete Phase I is extended from one month to six weeks. See
ECMR, supra note 21, art. 10(1) (noting that the period in which the commission is
to make its decision is extended to six weeks where a Member State submits a re-
quest to the commission).
137 With an Article 6(1)(a) decision, the Commission firds that the concentra-
tion does not fall within the scope of the ECMR. Id. art. 6(1)(a).
138 If an in-depth investigation is launched, the entire process can last five
months.
139 The approval of the merger can also be subjected to conditions and obli-
gations. Id. art. 6(2) (Conditions & Obligations) decision.
140 If a notification is incomplete, there is also the possibility that the periods
do not even start to run, since only a completed Form CO triggers the beginning
of the one-four month time period. In the last two years notifications have been
declared incomplete by the Commission for basically three reasons: (a) technical
impossibility of receiving the notification, (b) inadequacy of the information pro-
vided, and (c) non-identification of the potential markets by the notifying parties.
In 1997,17 cases out of 172 notifications were declared incomplete. In 1998,17 out
of 196 cases were declared incomplete.
141 For this the parties also face fines. See ECMR, supra note 21, art 14 (ex-
plaining that the commission may impose fines of up to E50 thousand where per-
sons have negligently or intentionally provided incomplete or incorrect informa-
tion).
142 According to the ECJ, the Commission is not a tribunal in the sense of Ar-
ticle 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights ("ECHR"). Joined Cases
100-103/80, SA Musique Diffusion Franqaise v. Commission, 1983 E.C.R. 1825.
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sion of a national European authority. The Commission thus acts
as both investigator and decision-making body. Its act is subject to
judicial review. The merger control process is therefore less foren-
sic and less visible to the general public than it is in the United
States with its emphasis on court procedure.143 The question of a
possible appeal against the Commission's decision was an issue in
the battle of words between the United States and Europe. In
GE/Honwell, the American side argued that the right to appeal in
Europe is less comprehensive than it is in the United States and
that GE and Honeywell were thus effectively prevented from pur-
suing their case beyond the Commission.44 While it is certainly
true (and not surprising) that the appeals process in both systems
differs, 145 it cannot be said that there is no effective appeals process
in Europe. 46 The notifying parties may appeal to the European
Court of Justice ("Eq") if they are dissatisfied with the decisiob of
143 It must observed that despite this characteristic experience shows that
many cases in the United States are settled out of court or abandoned by the par-
ties. It could thus correctly be argued that the merger policy in both systems is, in
effect, almost exclusively in the hands of the enforcement agencies. See Kauper,
supra note 48, at 317.
144 Cf. Patterson & Shapiro, supra note 62, at 22 (arguing that the available
right to appeal the Commission's decision to the CFI "does not provide the same
discipline in the review process as the requirement in the United States system
that antitrust agencies obtain a court order enjoining the consummation of the
transaction").
145 To start, the European legal and judicial system is largely based on French
law and the French court system, which is very different from the Anglo-Saxon
common law system in terms of both substantive law and the administration of
justice. One of the most important differences between the systems is that Euro-
pean law has no rule of precedent;, its decisions thus do not create law but merely
interpret statutes. However, like in other continental European systems, and for
the sake of predictability and legal certainty, the Court strives for consistency and
only on rare occasions reverses previous positions. See, e.g., Joined Cases C-
267/91 & 268/91, Criminal Proceedings against Bernard Keck and Daniel Mi-
thouard, 1993 E.C.R. 1-6097 [1990], [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. 101 (1995). But see Patterson
& Shapiro, supra note 62, at 22 (arguing that it appears that at least the Commis-
sion's decisions have no force or effect similar to a U.S. court decision).
146 See Joined Cases 100-103/80, Musique Diffusion Franqaise v. Commission,
1993 E.C.R. 1?>25; Case T-34?ZJ9%, Ensmo Espai ola SA v. Commiission, 1999 E.C.R. R1-
1875 [1998]. It is also not true that the Court will always follow the Commission
as is evidenced by the strong language the E.C.J. used to squash the Commission's
decision in Kali und Salz. Kali und Saz, supra note 110. See also Monti, supra note
12, at 14 (noting that a large percentage of merger prohibitions by the Commission
have been scrutinized by the courts and that this scrutiny ensures a Commision
will make a decision that will hold up under examination). See also Francisco-
Enrique Gonzalez-Diaz's comments in Roundtable Discussion, supra note 133, at 13.
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the Commission (denied merger clearance or imposition of
fines).147 Merger (as well as other competition law) cases are han-
dled first by the European Court of First Instance ("CFI").148 An
appeal against a decision of the CFI, on points of law only, is made
to the ECJ. However, unless the Court specifically decides so, this
appeal does not automatically suspend the merger. 49
Competitors of the notifying parties may also challenge a deci-
sion of the Commission to dear a concentration before the CFI un-
der Article 230 EC.is0 However, this private enforcement of anti-
trust law is comparatively rare in Europe.'5'
147 Competitors also have the possibility of lodging a complaint with the
Commission before it has made its final decision. These complaints are most
likely to express concerns about the proposed concentration. No specific form is
prescribed; however, the Commission has drafted Form C, which can be used as a
template. 1993 O.J. (L 336) 25.
148 Before the CFI was established in 1988, all cases went directly to the ECJ.
149 Statute of the Court of Justice, Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Jus-
tice of the European Economic Community, Art. 53, Apr. 17, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S.
147 (1958), amended by Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European
Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related
Acts, art. 6 III(3)(c), 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1. at http://europa.eu.int/cj/en/txts
/acting/statut.htm.
150 According to this provision, any natural or legal person may institute pro-
ceedings against a decision that is of direct and individual concern. The Courts
have taken a broad view as to who qualifies as a concerned party under competi-
tion law. See Case 25/62, Plaumann & Co. v. Commission, 1963 E.C.R. 95, 124,
[196413 C.M.L.R. 29 (1963) (broadly construing the term "person" in Article 173(2)
of the E.E.C. Treaty to include Member States); Case 75/84, Metro-SB-
Grossmarkte GmbH & Co KG v. Commission, 1986 E.C.R. 3021, 3080, [1987] 1
C.M.L.R. 118 (1986) (articulating when a third party is directly and individually
concerned by a Commission decision); Cases T-528/93, T-542/93, T-543/93, T-
546/93, M~tropole T0l6vision SA v. Commission, 1996 E.C.R. 1851, 1871, [1996] 5
C.M.L.R. 386 (1996) (finding some of the third party competitor applications ad-
missible and others inadmissible).
151 "In the United States, most enforcement is done at the private party level,
largely because, unlike in Europe, juries decide damages, and in the area of anti-
trust, treble damages apply." Shanker A. Singham, Shaping Competition Policy in
the Americas: Scope for Transatlantic Cooperation?, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 363, 389
(1998). In Europe, the ECJ cannot award damages to third parties; therefore,
damages would have to be sought, if at all, in the national courts. It is still de-
bated whether or not the laws of the Member States must give redress to indi-
viduals whose rights have been infringed under Community law. The ECJ has
stated that national courts must ensure that remedies are available to individuals,
which are sufficient to ensure real and effective protection of their community
rights. In the case of Francovich v. Italy, Cases C-6/90 & 9/90,1991 E.C.R. 1-5357,
[19931 2 C.M.L.R. 66 (1991), the Eq decided that a Member State must make repa-
ration for losses arising in consequence of the Member State's breach of Commu-
nity Law. European law thus acknowledges a claim in vertical violations. So far,
[23:2354
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol23/iss2/4
EUROPEAN MERGER CONTROL
Until now, the Commission has actually prevented very few
mergers.152 However, this result is not necessarily due to the fact
that the mergers would, in the view of the Commission, not have
led to a dominant position. Rather, and similar to the situation in
the United States, in many cases, the parties, after negotiations
with the Commission, undertook to disperse of parts of their busi-
nesses in order to overcome concerns that had been raised during
these discussions. This was particularly the case in the U.S. merg-
ers of AOL and Time Warner'5 3 and Boeing and McDonnell Doug-
las.154 This tactic also played a major role in the GE/Honeywell case
in which GE offered to divest a substantial part of its financing ac-
tivity in order to meet the Commission's concerns. 55
Unlike the United States, 156 the Commission cannot observe the
subsequent behavior of the parties under merger control rules and
English Courts, for example, have not awarded damages for infringements of EC
Articles 81 and 82. In early February 2002, the Commercial Court in London was
about to hear the first action of its kind in Yeheskel Arkin v. Borchard Lines, Ltd. for
breach of EC Articles 81 and 8Z Damages were awarded, however, in Germany
(OLG Dfisseldorf, - Metro/Cartier, 40 WIRTSCHAFr UND WETBEWERB 141 (1988),
WuW/E OLG 4407) and in France (CA Paris, 4e ch., Mar. 23,1989 (Euro Garage v.
Renault)).
152 Before the decision in GE/Honeywell, the latest decision was taken on Janu-
ary 31, 2001 in Case COMP/M.2097, SCA/Metsl Tissue v. Commission (2001),
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/cases/index
/bynrm_41.html#m_2097, and that was only the fourteenth instance since the
entry into force of the ECMvR in 1990 where the Commission stopped a merger
from going through. Three mergers were prohibited after GE/Honeywell, bringing
the total number to 18. These cases are Case COMP/M.2283, Schneider/Legrand
v. Comission, see Press Release, Commission Prohibits Acquisition of Control of
Legrand by Schneider Electric (Oct. 10, 2001), available at http://europa.eu.int
/comm/competition/mergers/cases/index/bynrm_45.html#n_2283; Case
COMP/M.2187; CVC/Lenzig v. Commission (2001), available at http://europa.eu
.int/comm/competition/mergers/cases/index/by nr m 43.html#m2187; Case
COMP/M.2416, Tetra Laval/Sidel v. Commission (2001), available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/cases/index/by-nr.m- 48
.html#m_2416. This means that well over a quarter of all prohibitions under the
ECMR since 1990 were decided in 2001. It must not be overlooked that in a large
number of cases the parties agreed to certain undertakings (e.g., to dispose of
parts of their business) and thus avoided a negative decision by the Commission.
153 See infra Section 3.2.
154 See infra Section 3.1.
155 See infra Section 4.
156 In United States v. E.L du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 597 (1957),
the Supreme Court held that the legality of a merger or acquisition under Section
7 of the Clayton Act is determined as of the time of the suit rather than at the time
of the stock or asset acquisition. See also United States v. ITT Cont'l Baking Co.,
420 U.S. 223, 241-42 (1975) ("[Alcquisition under § 7 is not a discrete transaction
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intervene if the merger later tuns out to be anti-competitive.5 7
The Commission can do so "only" under general competition law.
At first glance, this provides an effective tool to address anti-
competitive behavior. However, a general competition investiga-
tion is very time consuming. Instead of a merger investigation, an
Article 82 EC investigation was suggested to address the Commis-
sion's concern about possible bundling. Such an investigation can
take information about the actual behavior of a party into account,
whereas a merger control investigation that takes place before such
behavior may well be based on speculation.
2.3. Extraterritorial Application of EC Merger Control Rules
One of the most frequently asked questions regarding the
GE/Honeywell merger is how and why a non-United States body
like the Commission can assume jurisdiction in a case that solely
involves U.S. companies, which will take place on American soil,
and which has already received the blessing of the competent U.S.
authority ("How dare they?").
The ECMR, like any other national regime, aims to protect its
home markets from distortions, rather than concern itself with the
state of the world's market in general. 158 In many cases, distortions
of the Common Market come from within the market itself, e.g.,
when two or more companies from one or more Member States
merge or take over one another and thus create a dominant posi-
tion within the Common Market. However, it is also possible that
a merger transacted outside Europe has an impact on the Common
Market. Subjecting these "foreign" mergers to European jurisdic-
tion poses problems of public international law because, as a rule, a
state should not pass judgment upon acts that take place in another
state since doing so is the sovereign right of the state in which the
but a status which continues until the transaction is undone."); United States v.
Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 505 (1974). There is a statute of limitations
here that may limit the government's ability to challenge a merger itself at a later
date.
157 Mario Monti admitted that this was a notable difference between the
European and the U.S. systems: "We have a one shot possibility to approve or
block a merger." Phillip Shishkin, EU Makes It Official: No Honeywell for GE, WALL
ST. J. EUR., July 4, 2001, at 1.
158 This narrow view appears to have received some new thinking. See, e.g.,
Fox, supra note 1, at 3. See also discussion infra Section 5 of this Article.
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act occurs. 5 9 However, it is generally acknowledged that this
comity principle is not legally binding but rather adhortative, calling
upon the deference and good will of the states involved.160
In the United States, the possible application of the Sherman
Act in defiance of the comity principle to non-nationals who are
engaged in anti-competitive behavior outside the United States
was outlined in 1945 in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America
("Alcoa").161 Judge Learned Hand stated that "it is settled law...
that any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within
its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences
within its borders which the state reprehends .... ,,162 Thus, the Al-
coa case "laid the foundation for the more extensive application of
the Sherman Act to foreign cartels, which was to lead to the first
major conflicts over U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction"163 and paved
the way for the application of the "effects doctrine" in the United
'59 See Lotus Case (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.IJ. (ser. A) No. 10, at 23; IAN
BRowNLE, PRINCIPLES Op PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 29 (4th ed. 1990); F.A. MANN,
THE DOCTRINE OF JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 111 RECEUIL DE COURS 122
(1964).
16 Comitas Gentium can be translated roughly as friendliness among peoples.
See also Brown v. Babbitt Ford, Inc., 571 P.2d 689, 695 (Ariz. Ct App. 1977); L.
OPPEN-EIM, INTERNATIONALLAW 34 n.1 (9thed. 1955).
161 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945). See also Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank
of Amer., 549 F.2d 597, 608-15 (9th Cir. 1976); Hartford Fire Ins. v. California, 509
U.S. 764,796 (1993).
162 United States v. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443 (emphasis added). In contrast, in
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909), Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes stated that "the general and almost universal rule is that the
character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of
the country where the act is done."
163 PETER T. MUCHUNKSI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW 130
(1995); William E. Kovacic, Transatlantic Turbulence: The Boeing-McDonnell Douglas
Merger and International Competition Policy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 805, 846 (2001).
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States 64 and, later, in other jurisdictions 165 as well as a criterion 66
for overriding the conaity principle.167
In Europe, the ECI, in its early case law on the matter, origi-
nally rejected the idea of an effects doctrine. Thstead, the Court
took the view that the question must be asked where an agreement
is "implemented." 68 If implementation takes place in the Com-
munity, it has jurisdiction.169 Since the difference between "effect"
and "implementation" seems to be marginal, it appears that the
Community authorities have been applying an effects doctrine in
all but name.170 Recently, the CFI expressly recognized that public
international law allows for an effects doctrine, but still adhered to
the criterion of "implementation" rather than "effect." 171
Many mergers will require notification not only to the Com-
mission, but also to other national competition authorities outside
the EU. In oarder to obtain and supply information from and to
other authorities and also in an attempt to avoid inconsistent deci-
sions, the Commission has established a network of co-operation
164 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 403 (1996).
165 See, e.g., Act Against Restraints of Competition § 130(2) GWB (Germany);
Competition Act, 1998 c. 41, § 2(3) (Eng.). In an Aide-mdmoire of October 20,1969
to the Commission, the British government expressed the view that "[A] state
should not exercise jurisdiction against a foreigner who, or a foreign company,
which has committed no act within its territory." EXTRATEsRITORIAL JURISDICTION
144,146 (A.V. Lowe, ed. 1983).
166 Snyder, supra note 48, at 120-22.
167 The decision to depart from the comity principle must be a balanced one
in terms of the interest of the States involved. See Ernst-Joachim Mestmicker, Sta-
atliche Souverdnitfit und offene Mdirkte, 52 Rabels Zeitschrift 205, 241-49 (1988).
168 Cases 89/85, 104/85, 114/85, 116-85, 117/85, 125/85, 126/85, 127/85,
128/85,129/85, A. Ahlstrbm Osakeyhti6 v. Commission (Wood Pulp), 1988 E.C.R.
5193, 5217, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. 901. Advocate-General Warner had argued for the
adoption of "direct, substantial and foreseeable effect," stating that the Commu-
nity was entitled to use the effects doctrine under public international law. Id. at
5227.
169 The criterion of implementation is satisfied by mere sales within the
Community, regardless of the source or location of the sources of supply or pro-
duction. Case T-102/96, Gencor Ltd. v. Commission, 1999 E.C.R. 11-753, 784 (1999)
[hereinafter Gencor].
170 Cf. WHISH, supra note 22, at 400; Roberto, supra note 9, at 614; Snyder, supra
note 48, at 121.
171 Gencor, supra note 169, at 11-785. But see Mestmcker, supra note 167, at
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with the competent authorities in other jurisdictions. 172  In
GE/Honeyvell, this played an important role because the Commis-
sion was in close contact with its U.S. counterpart from the initial
notification to the DOJ and was, allegedly, regularly informed of
the investigation process.
3. HISTORY OF COMMISSION DECISIONS PERTAINING TO U.S.
COMPANIES
In terms of subjecting U.S. mergers to EC regulations, the deci-
sion in GE/Honeyvell was not the first of its kind. Other decisions
preceded GE/Honey vell and some attracted similarly big headlines
at the time of their investigation/decision.
3.1. Boeing/McDonnell Douglas
In February 1997, Boeing and McDonnell Douglas, two U.S. jet
manufacturers, notified the Commission of a proposed merger that
would eliminate one of the three remaining competitors in the
market for large commercial jet aircraft. Although the merger re-
ceived approval by the FTC73 as well as the Commission 74 this
case very dearly illustrated the different approaches taken on the
American and European sides of the Atlantic. 7s In Europe, it was
largely expected that the Commission would block the merger be-
cause it would create market dominance for Boeing, whose share
in the market for large jet aircraft would increase from 64% to
70%j76
172 Under the 1991 Agreement with the United States (Agreement Between
the Government of The United States of America and the Commission of the
European Communities Regarding the Application of Their Competition Laws,
1995 OJ. (L 131) 38, corrected at 1995 O.J. (L 131) 38, supplemented by Agreement
Between the European Communities and the Government of the United States of
America on the Application of Positive Comity Principles in the Enforcement of
their Competition Laws, 1998 O.J. (L 173) 28), the Commission will notify the U.S.
authorities upon reception of a notification and invite their comments. Coopera-
tion between the authorities is frequent and not limited to individual cases. It is
possible that information supplied to one authority will be reviewed by the other.
Therefore, before submitting information to one authority, the notifying party
should ask itself if the information is consistent with material that has been or will
be submitted to another authority.
173 Four to one majority decision of July 1,1997.
174 Boeing/McDonnell Douglas, supra note 3.
175 Kovacic, supra note 163, at 851, 863.
176 In the wide body market it would increase from 71% to 73%; in the narrow
body market from 55% to 66%. It was feared that in the segment of smallest nar-
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Initially, the FTC concluded that the proposed merger "[o]n its
face.., appears to raise serious antitrust concerns."'177 However,
although it fell short of declaring McDonnell Douglas a failing
firm,178 the FTC believed it was not capable of exercising any influ-
ence on the market. It no longer had a chance to receive any orders
for a large aircraft and no economically plausible strategy could
change this situation.179
The Commission saw the merger as being more problematic:
its concern centered on the already existing dominant position of
Boeing, which was about to be strengthened through the acquisi-
tion. 80 Although the Commission agreed with the FTC that
McDonnell Douglas was no longer as viable a competitor l8 as Air-
bus, it still saw an increase of Boeing's market power through the
acquisition of the now largely impotent competitor. By acquiring
McDonnell Douglas, Boeing's custome-r base would broaden as it
gained access to eighty-five airlines that did not yet operate Boeing
aircraft, but either exclusively McDonnell Douglas aircraft or a
combination of McDonnell Douglas and Airbus aircraft. 8 2 The
Commission was also concerned about the use of technical know-
how from McDonnell Douglas' military branch for the civilian
row aircraft with 100 to 120 seats, Boeing would, over time, gain a monopoly and
a near monopoly in the freighter segment. Boeing/McDonnell Douglas, supra
note 3, para. 57.
177 Statement of Chairman Robert Pitofsky and Commissioners Janet D. Stei-
ger, Roscoe B. Stark, and Christiae A. Vamey in the matter of the Boeing Com-
pany/McDonnell Douglas Corp., File No. 971-0051, available at http://www.ftc.
gov/opa/1997/9707/boeingsta.htm.
178 The failing firm defense was developed by the Supreme Court in Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930). See also Citizen Publ'g Co. v. United
States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969). This principle was also adopted in the 1992 Merger
Guidelines. In order to invoke this defense, a firm must show that it is in immi-
nent danger of financial failure, that the alleged failing firm would be unable to
reorganize under bankruptcy laws, and that a good faith attempt to sell the firm
to an alternative buyer was made but was unsuccessful.
179 In her statement, Commissioner Azcuenega held that the majority
wrongly relied on the so-called General Dynamics defense according to which
market shares that are based on past performance may overstate a firm's future
competitive significance. In contrast, McDonnell Douglas may need more cus-
tomers for its products, but having won fewer customers than it might want does
not make Douglas unable to compete for future sales. News Release, Statement of
Commissioner Mary L. Azcuenaga in the Boeing Company, File No. 971-0051,
available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1997/9707/ma.htm.
180 Boeing/McDonnell Douglas, supra note 3, para. 53-112.
181 Id. para. 58.
182 In contrast, of 561 airlines operating worldwide, only 316 use Boeing.
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sector. 8 3 Another concern was Boeing's capability in terms of ex-
clusive deals it could offer customers, which, in the eyes of the
Commission, would be enhanced. Within the existing exclusive
deals Boeing had with a number of U.S. airlines, it could now offer
McDonnell Douglas aircraft as well as spare parts and support
service for older aircraft. It is noteworthy that the Commission ob-
served that the combination of a broader product range, financial
resources, and higher capacity-and thus the ability to respond to
airlines' needs for deliveries on a short lead-time-would signifi-
cantly increase Boeing's ability to induce airlines to enter into ex-
clusive deals. Airbus, the only remaining competitor, would not
be able to offer such exclusive deals because Airbus is unable to of-
fer a full "family" of aircraft.184
The merger only received the green light from the Commission
after Boeing agreed to a -number of significant -mdextakings, most
notably to maintain McDonnell Douglas as an independent com-
pany for a period of ten years and to provide customer support for
McDonnell Douglas aircraft at the same level provided for Boeing
aircraft. 85 Very importantly, Boeing also undertook not to enter
into additional exclusive agreements until 2007 and not to exercise
its exclusive rights under existing agreements with U.S. carriers.
186
Many observers had expected the Commission to stop the
merger between Boeing and McDonnell Douglas, 8 7 but it seemed
at that time that the Commission shied away from the political im-
pact such a decision would have had.188 This was despite the fact
that the Commission was under intense pressure from Boeing's
sole competitor, Airbus, and a number of European politicians who
saw the chances of Airbus' economical success and survival in
183 Boeing/McDonnell Douglas, supra note 3, para. 65-67.
184 Id. para. 70.
185 Boeing would also continue to give support to McDonnell Douglas air-
craft if the operator proposed to purchase another manufacturer's aircraft and
would not use its position to persuade McDonnell Douglas customers to buy
Boeing aircraft. Id. para. 115.
196 Id. para. 116.
187 On July 4,1997, the fifteen member advisory panel, consisting of the chiefs
of the Member States' antitrust enforcement agencies, unanimously recommended
that the Commission block the merger. Karel van Miert, then Commissioner for
Competition, quickly attained Commission support for this stance. See Stock, su-
pra note 46, at 841.
188 For a comprehensive analysis of this case and the decisions of both the
FTC and the Commission, see Kovacic, supra note 163.
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jeopardy. For the same reason, albeit in relation to Boeing, there
was a lot of pressure in the United States to allow the merger.
8 9
3.2. AOL/ Time Warner
Although the merger between the U.S. companies AOL and
Time Warner also received approval from both authorities, the dif-
ferences between European and U.S. merger control also surfaced.
In April 2000, the Commission received a notification of a pro-
posed concentration by which Internet provider AOL would merge
with Time Warner, Inc., the media giant that counted among its as-
sets CNN, Warner Bros., several publishing companies, as well as
music and TV content providers.190 Although AOL is primarily a
provider of Internet services,' 91 it also offers software, like the Net-
scape browser. Most importantly, AOL also had close -ties with
German media giant Bertelsmann 92 which has a large amount of
music and film content at its disposal.
The FTC was concerned that AOL would stop promoting the
Digital Subscriber Line ("DSL") technique as an alternative to
broadband cable because Time Warner in the United States was the
largest broadband cable network and also held a large share in an
Internet company which used broadband cable technology.193 The
FTC therefore aimed at opening Time Warner's cable network for
other suppliers of Internet service.
In Europe, neither AOL nor Time Warner had broadband fa-
cilities. The Commission was concerned about the vertical integra-
tion of both companies. Through its merger with Time Warner,
AOL, as an Internet service provider would have access to a very
attractive package of content.194 Through its existing ties with
189 Snyder, supra note 48, at 137.
190 For a comprehensive list of Time Warner's businesses, see AOL/Time
Warner, supra note 4, para. 12.
191 In fact, AOL commands three Internet Service Providers ("ISP"), AOL,
CompuServe, and Netscape Online, with about 27 million subscribers, of which
4.3 million are in Europe.
192 Bertelsmann owned 50% of AOL Europe, S.A. and had a four-year content
agreement with AOL. See AOL/Time Warner, supra note 4, paras. 8, 10.
193 Baker, supra note 1, at 582.
194 Time Warner also intended to merge its activities with EMI. The three
companies, EMI, Time Warner, and Bertelsmann, would have held about 50% of
the world's music publishing rights in Europe. See Mario Monti, European Com-
munity Competition Law: European Competition for the 21st Century, 24 FORDHAM
INT'LLJ. 1602,1610 (2001).
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Germany's Bertelsmann AG, it would be possible for the newly-
created company to determine the conditions for the online trans-
mission of music, which would enable it to gain a dominant posi-
tion in the market of online music. 95 The Commission also con-
cluded "that the new entity would become dominant in the market
for music software." 196 Here, the Commission thought that the
new company could format Time Warner and Bertelsmann music
to make it compatible only with Winamp, the AOL software. Wi-
namp is currently the only software to play almost all music on the
Internet, including that in other formats. "By refusing to license its
technology, the new entity would impose Winamp as the domi-
nant music player .... Given their technical limitations, competing
music players [would] exert no competitive constraint on the pric-
ing of Winamp."'197 As a result, AOL/Time Warner would control
this "dominant player software and could charge supra-
competitive prices for it."'198
In order to remedy the concerns of the Commission, the parties
agreed to sever the connections between AOL Europe and
Bertelsmann and to keep Bertelsmann music available online for
other music players, thus avoiding the exclusive use of Winamp.199
The Commission then declared the proposed merger compatible
with the Common Market
3.3. MCI WorldCom/Sprint
The Commission decision in the proposed merger of the U.S.
telephone and Internet giants MCI and Sprint was the first to actu-
ally stop a deal from going through. There are a number of factors
that make MCI/Sprint different from GE/Honeywell. First, the deal
did not receive the blessing of the U.S. authorities before the
Commission reached a negative verdict. Second, after they had en-
countered strong opposition from the Commission, the parties ac-
tually decided to abandon the enterprise. However, since MCI and
195 AOL/Time Warner, supra note 4, paras. 46-59. Mario Monti noted that
with this merger, "AOL could have emerged as the gatekeeper in the emerging
market for Internet music delivery on-line." Monti, FORDHAM INT'L LJ., supra note
194, at 1610.
196 AOL/Time Warner, supra note 4, para. 65.
197 Id. para. 62.
193 Id.
199 Id. para. 95.
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Sprint did not formally withdraw the notification, the Commission
had to render a formal decision.200
The Commission identified the key market affected by the
merger as top-level or universal Internet connectivity.20' MCI
WorldCom had a market share of 40% to 60% whereas Sprint, the
second largest top-level network provider, had a share of 10% to
15%.202 The Commission concluded from these figures that the
merger would lead to the creation of a top-level network provider
that through its sheer size would be able to behave independently
of its competitors and customers,203 and would lead to a dominant
position.204 The Commission was thus satisfied with the high level
of market shares, although it commented-consistently with the
two-tier approach-on the impact the merger would have had on
competition.
In comparison to the cases already referred to and especially in
comparison to GE/Honeywvell, MCI WorldCom/Sprint was relatively
straightforward. It owes its prominence largely to the fact that it
was the first case of a U.S. corporate merger prohibited by the
Commission.
4. THE DECISION IN GE/HONEYWELL
By mid-2000, U.S. giants GE and Honeywell entered into nego-
tiations for a possible merger or, to be more precise, a takeover of
the latter by the former. On October 22, 2000, the parties signed an
agreement pursuant to which GE agreed to acquire the entire share
capital of Honeywell for a purchase price of $42 billion. Thus
Honeywell would have become a wholly owned subsidiary of GE.
In October 2000 the parties notified the DOJ, and four months later,
the Commission, of the proposed merger.205
4.1. The Decision in the United States
In its investigation, the DOJ identified two key markets that
were affected by the merger: the market for military helicopter en-
200 MCI WorldCom/Sprint, supra note 5, para. 12.
201 Id. para. 52-53.
202 Id. para. 100.
203 Id. para. 145.
204 Id. para. 196.
205 The Commission was notified of the merger on February 5, 2001. Case
COMP/M.2220, General Electric/Honeywell, 2001 O.J. (C 46) 6.
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gines, and the market for providing heavy maintenance, repair,
and overhaul ("MRO") services for aircraft engines and auxiliary
power units ("APU"). This finding is interesting because, as will
be seen, the Commission identified completely different markets,
most prominently those of avionics and jet aircraft engines, as be-
ing at the heart of the decision.
With regard to the first market, GE and Honeywell are the two
premier manufacturers of U.S. military helicopter engines, collec-
tively accounting for a substantial majority of all engines powering
military helicopters flying today.206 The DOJ found that the merger
would have substantially lessened competition in the production
of U.S. helicopter engines which, consequently, could expose the
U.S. military to higher prices, lower quality, and reduced innova-
tion in the design, development, and production of the next gen-
eration of advanced U.S. military helicopter engines.207 In order to
remedy this concern, the DOJ required the parties to divest Hon-
eywell's helicopter engine business that generated revenues of
$200 million in 2000.208
With regard to the second market, the DOJ feared that a range
of commercial business aircraft users would likely have suffered
increased prices and reduced quality in the repair and overhaul of
Honeywell aircraft engines and APUs as a likely result of the
strong and combined position of the merged company. The DOJ
therefore required the parties to authorize a new third-party MRO
service provider for certain models of Honeywell's aircraft engines
and APUs to introduce a new player in this market and thus allow
for more competition. With these conditions implemented, the
DOJ expressed the view that competition in both markets "will
continue to flourish," and on May 2, 2001, reached the appropriate
agreement with the parties.20
9
206 They also received virtually all of the applicable research and develop-
ment funding provided by the U.S. Department of Defense through its 3ointTur-
bine Advanced Gas Generator. Press Release, DOJ, Justice Department Requires
Divestitures in Merger Between General Electric and Honeywell (May 2, 2001),
available at http:// www.usdo.gov/atr/public/press-releases/20 01/ 8140.htm.
207 Id.
203 Id.
209 Id.
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4.2. The Case Before the Commission
4.2.1. History
The Commission hadk nowledge of the proposed merger at the
time notice was given to the U.S. authorities, and it is very likely
that it was involved in talks with the parties from that time on.2' 0
However, the Commission was not formally notified of the merger
proposal until February 2001. This was not only four months after
the notification in the United States, but probably also after the
DOJ had indicated that it would allow the deal to go through. It
could be that GE had hoped that the U.S. decision would put pres-
sure on the European authorities to approve the deal as well.21'
The first setback occurred on March 1, 2001, when the Commission
decided to open a full investigation into the merger.212 This in and
of itself was already an alarming sign, since about 95% of all cases
do not reach this stage. As a reason for its decision, the Commis-
sion stated that the first phase of the investigation indicated that
the merger might bring about horizontal overlaps in the market for
large regional jet engines, which would significantly reduce the
existing degree of competition in this market. In the Commission's
view there were also vertical effects "to the extent that Honeywell
is a supplier of components to competing engine manufactur-
ers." 213 Furthermore, there were conglomerate effects "stemming
from the possible bundling of jet engines, avionics and non-
210 U.S. Assistant Attorney General Charles James, in a speech before the
OECD Global Competition Forum in Paris, stated that the Commission had been
informed and involved in the discussions throughout the U.S. investigation. U.S.
Assistant Attorney General Charles A. James, Address Before the OECD Global
Forum on Competition (Oct. 17, 2001). Competition Commissioner Mario Monti
denied this fact, saying that he had some useful telephone conversations with Mr.
James in the days beforehand, but that it was unfortunately impossible to have
any discussions at all at the highest policy level." Briggs & Rosenblatt, supra note
13, at 28.
211 The parties approached both authorities at the same time, in early No-
vember 2000, to discuss the competition problems. However, it is said that it took
GE and Honeywell a very long time to prepare Form CO to the satisfaction of the
MTF. See Patterson & Shapiro, supra note 62, at 22.
212 See Press Release IP/01/298, Commission Opens Full Investigation into
the General Electric/Honeywell Merger (Feb. 3, 2001), available at http://europa
.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?reslist ("[T]he Commission will make a de-
tailed assessment of the impact of the transaction on competition.)
213 Id.
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avionics [that are] likely to foreclose competition in these mar-
kets."214
On May 8, 2001, GE received from the Commission a 155-page
statement of objection to the deal, reflecting continuing concerns
about the likely affected markets. This was a dear indication of the
upcoming difficulties. The statement invited the parties to
strengthen their efforts to reach an agreement with the Commis-
sion and stated that the merger would not be allowed in its current
form. In response, on June 14,2001, GE and Honeywell submitted
a package of undertakings to address the Commission's concerns.
When the Commission signaled that it did not consider this pack-
age sufficient, the parties withdrew the offer and submitted a new
and substantially modified set of undertakings on June 28, 2001.21-
This again proved unsuccessful, and after intensive last minute ne-
gotiations, on July 3, 2001, the Commission formally decided to
block the merger.
4.2.2. The Reasoning of the Commission
To the parties involved and their lawyers, the Commission's
decision came as a total surprise. They had not foreseen the degree
and amount of opposition that the Commission had built up to-
wards the proposed merger-particularly since the positive deci-
sion in the United States was based on the same facts.
216
In contrast to the DOJ, the Commission was not concerned
about the market for helicopters and MRO services. This is not
surprising because this market had very little effect on the Com-
mon Market and the issue had already been addressed and reme-
died by the DOJ investigation. Rather, the Commission identified
a number of other affected markets. The most important of these
214 Id.
215 This submission was actually inadmissible because Article 18 (2) of Regu-
lation 447/98 of Match 1, 1998 on the Notfications, Time Liuits and Hearings,
states that commitments intended by the parties to form the basis of a decision of
compatibility have to be submitted within three months of the decision to open
proceedings, which in the case of GE/IHoneywell would have been June 14, 2001.
Commission Regulation 447/98, 1998 OJ. (L 061) 1, 8. The Commission did not
see any reason that would justify an extension of the given timeframe.
216 See Helen Power, The Honeywell Monster, THE LAWYER, July 23, 2001, at 24-
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markets were those for jet aircraft engines, avionics, and engine
starters, to be addressed in detail below. 217
4.2.2.1. The Market for Jet Aircraft Engines
According to the Commission, the market for jet aircraft en-
gines had to be divided into three categories which depended on
the markets for aircraft:218 (a) large commercial aircraft, i.e., those
with more than 100 seats and a range greater than 2000 nautical
miles, (b) regional jet aircraft, i.e., those with around 30 to 90 seats
and a range of less than 2000 nautical miles, and (c) corporate jet
aircraft, i.e., those designed for corporate activities.219
4.2.2.1.1. Market Share
In the market for large commercial aircraft engines, of the two
parties to the merger, only GE was active. Apart from GE, the
players in this market are Pratt & Whitney and Rolls-Royce. It was
undisputed that the position of GE in this market before the
merger was strong. In terms of installed engines, GE had an over-
all market share of 52.5%, compared to Pratt & Whitney's 26.5%
and Rolls-Royce's 21 %.220 A share of just over 50% lies in the gray
zone of possible dominance as evidenced by market share and well
above the unofficial safety line of 40%.221
In the market for regional aircraft engines both GE and Hon-
eywell were again competing with Pratt & Whitney and Rolls-
Royce. However, the Commission concluded that there were dis-
tinct markets for large and small regional aircraft and found that
only GE and Honeywell were supplying engines for the large
217 The Commission also commented at length on other markets that are of
less importance to this Article.
218 The Commission stated that the engines are complementary products to
the aircraft, the sale of one being of no value without the sale of the other. As a
consequence, in defining the relevant jet engines product markets, one needs to
take into account the competition between the end-use applications - that is, be-
tween the types of aircraft that final buyers consider suitable. GE/Honeywell, su-
pra note 7, para. 9.
219 Id. para. 10.
220 Id. para. 70 (quoting data provided by the parties and based on installed
base of engines on large commercial aircraft in service on December 21, 2000).
The picture is different when one looks at the shares of orders for engines as of
January 1, 2001. Here, GE has a share of 65%, Pratt & Whitney 16%, and Rolls-
Royce 19%.
221 See sources supra note 89.
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ones.222 Of the two, GE had a share of between 60% and 70% in the
market for aircraft which are still in production, and Honeywell,
which only supplied the engine to one type of aircraft, a market
share of between 30% and 40%.m The position of GE in this mar-
ket was thus already considered dominant. With the acquisition of
Honeywell, the combined market share would have amounted to
100% and thus a monopoly position.
Both GE and Honeywell were active in the market for corpo-
rate aircraft engines and were competing with Pratt & Whitney as
well as Rolls-Royce. Here, GE's position was weaker, with engines
installed mostly in aircraft that were no longer in production. GE's
market share of overall engines installed was 10% to 20%, Honey-
well's was 40% to 50%, Pratt & Whitney's 30% to 40%, and Rolls-
Royce's 10% to 20%.224 Honeywell's position in this market could
thus be described as strong, and the combined market share of the
new company after the merger would have been between 50% and
60%.
4.2.2.1.2. Dominant Position
There are two questions to be addressed in connection with the
issue of dominance: first, whether or not GE or Honeywell had al-
ready enjoyed a dominant position before the merger; and, second,
whether either previously non-existing dominance could be cre-
ated or previously existing dominance could be strengthened
through the merger.
4.2.2.1.2.1. Pre-Existing Dominance of GE or
Honeywell
The Commission did not find GE's market share of about 60%
in the market for large aircraft engines sufficient to establish mar-
ket dominance per se although it found it to be indicative. 5 A
similar opinion was taken with regard to Honeywell's position in
the market for corporate jet aircraft engines.2 6 Not surprisingly, in
the market for large regional aircraft engines, with a share of 60%
222 GE/HoneyweU, supra note 7, paras. 19-29
23 Id. para. 84.
224 Id. para. 88 (based on data provided by the parties).
225 Id. para. 83.
226 Id. para. 89.
2002] 369
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
to 70%, the Commission considered GE as already dominant227-
without having to resort to other factors.
Having failed to establish dominance in the market for large
aircraft engines based on market share alone, the Commission had
to turn to other factors that would enhance GE's position, and here
it focused on GE's overall strength, especially its financial strength.
First, the Commission commented on GE's financial arm, GE
Capital.22 s This subsidiary managed about $370 billion and thus
more than 80% of GE's assets. The Commission maintained that
through the financial strength of GE Capital, GE would gain a sig-
nificant advantage over its competitors who had nothing equiva-
lent. GE Capital could, in the view of the Commission, be used to
absorb potential product failures and strategic mistakes.229 GE
could also use (and had done so in the past) the financial strength
to heavily discount prices for jet engines. Moreover, the Commis-
sion argued that the financial strength of GE Capital could be used,
and had been used, to afford significant financial support to air-
frame manufacturers in platform program development assistance,
and thus obtain a monopoly for engines for those airframes.230 The
Commission held that these exclusive agreements would signifi-
cantly affect the engine market since they guaranteed significant
penetration of an airline's fleet and subsequent incumbency bene-
fits.231 Apart from influencing the manufacturers of airframes, the
strength of GE Capital could also be used to influence airlines in
their buying decisions. The Commission quoted from a book
written by Jack Welch, CEO of GE, recounting a loan which GE
Capital arranged for Continental Airlines when the airline was in
227 Id. para. 87.
M Id. paras. 107-20.
229 As evidence for its argument, the Commission cites the example of Rolls-
Royce who, after the failure of one of its R&D projects in the 1970s, had to exit
from the relevant market. Id. para. 110.
230 In return for putting in a $2 billion advance order for the long-range ver-
sion of Boeing's 777, GE was designated the exclusive engine supplier for the
plane. GE has secured a total of 10 exclusive positions out of the last 12 that were
granted by airframe manufacturers. Id. para. 114.
231 Id. para. 155.
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financial difficulty in 199332 A few months later, Continental or-
dered GE engines for its aifcraft.233
Next, the Commission addressed the position and powers of
GE Capital Aviation Services ("GECAS"), GE's airplane leasing di-
vision and-with a share of 10% of purchases of all new aircraft-
the world's largest airplane buyer.234 GECAS has the largest single
fleet of aircraft with 1040 tnits, making it twice as big as its direct
competitor, International Lease Finance Corporation ("ILFC"). The
Commission stated that GECAS could enhance GE's position in the
market through attractive financing packages for purchasing deals
of large aircraft. Over the past decade, of more that 600 planes
purchased by GECAS, only four did not have GE engines. While
GECAS' innovative financing techniques could result in attractive
packages for customers, the Commission thought it would create
an unfair advantage over competitors like Rolls-Royce and Pratt &
Whitney because GECAS could demand the use of GF, engines on
all plane purchases. 2m
The Commission concluded that the combination of the ad-
vantages GE enjoyed through GE Capital and GECAS made GE's
high market shares "proxy for dominance."236 This is aggravated
by the fact that GE's competitors were not in a position to offer
anything even close to the financial services of GE.237 The Com-
mission concluded that given the nature of the jet engines market,
GE's position with many airlines, its incentive to use GE Capital's
powers with customers, and its ability to leverage its vertical inte-
gration through GECAS, GE appeared to be in a position to behave
independently of its competitors, customers, and ultimately, con-
sumers. It therefore concluded that GE could be characterized as a
232 Id. para. 117 (quoting John Curran, GE Capital: Jack Welch's Secret Weapon,
FORTUNE, (Nov. 10, 1997), available at http://www.ge.com/news/welch
/articles/f1197.htm). After the deal, consultant Tichy is quoted as having said
cryptically: "Capital is part of the arsenal for GE's industrial side to beat the compe-
tition." rd. (emphasis added).
23 In fact, Continental Airlines aircraft use predominantly GE engines. The
Commission showed figures according to which the airline chose GE engines over
those of its competitors every time it had a choice. Id. para. 119.
234 Id. para. 122.
235 Id. para. 127.
236 Id. para. 163.
237 Id. paras. 173-223.
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dominant undertaking in the markets for large commercial jet air-
craft engines and for large regional jet aircraft engines.
2318
In order to overcome the reservations of the Commission, GE
offered, inter alia, to maintain GECAS as a separate legal entity and
to conduct its dealings with Honeywell on an arm's-length basis.2 39
An independent expert would monitor compliance. Not surpris-
ingly, the Commission was unsatisfied with this offer. It argued
that the mere legal separation of the entity would not affect its
management, and thus control would remain in the hands of GE.
Most importantly, the separation would not prevent GECAS from
exercising and continuing the commercial strategy of GE.240
4.2.2.1.2.2. Creation or Strengthening of Dominance
Through the Merger
Because GE had already enjoyed a dominant position in the
market for large commercial jet aircraft engines and regional air-
craft engines, the merger had to lead to a strengthening of this posi-
tion in order to meet the requirements of ECMR Article 2.241 In the
market for corporate aircraft engines where Honeywell was "only"
strong, ECMR Article 2 required the creation of such dominance.
Traditionally when assessing this question the Commission can
238 Id. para. 229.
239 Id. para. 498. In a second step, GE offered to divest 19.9% in GECAS. This
offer was held by the Commission to be insufficient because it would have left GE
with a substantial and decisive share in GECAS and would not have changed the
influence of GE over GECAS' policy. There is an argument as to whether this
share should have been sold to competitors or as part of a public sale. Gbtz
Drauz, head of the Merger Task Force, stated: "We never said you have to sell it to
competitors, we only said you have to find a way to guarantee independence, and
that was translated by some as meaning you have to sell to competitors." Power,
supra note 216, at 26.
240 GE/Honeywell, supra note 7, para. 531. It must also be noted that a di-
vestiture of GECAS would, at this point, have only eliminated its financial powers
related to the pre-existing dominance of GE in the large jet aircraft engine market.
Even if GE had sold GECAS completely and had thus convinced the Commission
that there was no pre-existing dominance by GE in this market, it is very unlikely
that the merger would have received the Commission's blessing. It would still
have been possible, indeed likely as will be shown below, that the merger would
have created a dominant position of GE, so the result of the investigation would
not have changed.
241 As in the United States, the mere existence of a dominant position is not
illegal under European law, as long as it is not abused - in which case it can be
subject to a review under EC Article 82.
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look at the vertical, horizontal, and conglomerate effects of the
merger. 242
4.2.2.1.2.2.1. Horizontal Effects
Since Honeywell was not active in the market for large com-
mercial jet aircraft engines, the question of horizontal effects was
limited to the market for large regional and corporate jet aircraft
engines, where both companies competed with one another. In the
market for large regional aircraft engines, GE was already domi-
nant. The addition of its competitor Honeywell, despite its fairly
small market share, would lead to a monopoly.243 In the corporate
jet engine market, Honeywell was already the leading player. The
addition of GE's market share would lead to a combined market
share of 50% to 60% of the overall installed base of corporate air-
craft and 80% to 90% of the installed base of engines on medium
corporate aircraft. In the Commission's view this combination of
market share would create a dominant position.244
The parties responded to the Commission's findings regarding
the large regional jet aircraft engine market by offering to divest
that part of their business that manufactures engines for certain
new aircraft. Apart from the fact that the Commission doubted
there was a purchaser for the business, it held that since the engine
was still in development, the divestiture to a third party would
"lead to significant uncertainty as to the timetable of the develop-
ment as well as to the sales prospects of the aircraft."245
4.2.2.1.2.2.2. Vertical Effects
With regard to large commercial aircraft engines, the concern
for the vertical effects of the proposed merger focused on Honey-
well's strong position in the market for engine starters.246 The ver-
tical foreclosure of the competing engine manufacturers resulting
from a vertical relationship between GE as an engine manufacturer
and Honeywell as a supplier of engine starters to GE and its com-
242 WHIsH, supra note 22, at 774; Monti, supra note 12, at 6.
243 The increase was not so small that it could have qualified as insignificant
under a de minimis rule.
244 GE/Honeywell, supra note 7, para. 437.
245 Id. para. 519.
246 Id. para. 420. See also, infra, Section 4.2.2.3.
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petitors concerned the Commission.2 47 Following the proposed
merger, the merged entity would have an incentive to delay or dis-
rupt the supply of Honeywell engine starters to competing engine
manufacturers, which would damage the supply, distribution,
profitability, and competitiveness of these competitors. Also, the
merged entity could increase the price of engine starters or their
spares, thereby increasing rival engine manufacturers costs and
further damaging their ability to compete. This would contribute
to the further foreclosure of GE's competitors from the market for
large commercial aircraft engines and strengthen GE's dominant
position. With regard to the vertical effect on the market for corpo-
rate jet aircraft engines, the Commission was concerned about how
GE's financial strength and vertical integration into financial serv-
ices, aircraft purchasing and leasing, and other market services
would effect Honeywell as a corporate jet aircraft engine supplier.
The merger would also have vertical effects by bringing to-
gether the leading engine supplier, Honeywell, with GE's corpo-
rate jet aircraft leasing company, GE Capital Corporate Aviation
Group. Honeywell's engines and related services would benefit
from GE's aircraft leasing and its purchasing practice of promoting
GE products and services, as well as from its instrumental leverage
ability to secure market placement for GE products. The integra-
tion of Honeywell and GE was, in the view of the Commission
therefore likely to lead to foreclosure and elimination of competi-
tors' ability to invest in the development of the next generation of
corporate jet aircraft engines. Since Honeywell's corporate jet air-
craft engine competitors would be unable to reproduce GE's finan-
cial strength and vertical integration, they would eventually have
to reconsider their presence in the market and ultimately withdraw
since their chances of winning a competition on the merits would
be significantly reduced.248
4.2.2.1.2.2.3. Conglomerate Effects: Bundling
In GE/Honeywell, one of the main concerns of the Commission
was the new company's ability to bundle its products. This was by
no means an obvious concern. Rather, it came as a surprise to the
parties because, as will be shown, bundling had not played a
prominent role in merger control before. The Commission de-
247 GE/Honeywell, supra note 7, para. 419.
248 Id. para. 442.
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scribed bundling as a simple business arrangement whereby a
number of products are combined in a package and sold at a single
price.249 Bundling, and here lies the crux of the problem, is thus es-
sentially a behavioral problem: it addresses the question of how a
market player uses its powers. Merger control, on the other hand,
is concerned with the situation of the parties and the markets at the
time of the merger, not with possible future behavior.
In the market for large commercial aircraft engines the Com-
mission needed to show a strengthening of a dominant position.
However, it did not state that the newly merged entity would use
bundling to improve its market position.250 Rather, the Commis-
sion thought it sufficient that that the merged entity "[would] have
the ability to engage in packaged offers of engines, avionics and
other services." 251 Since none of its competitors could match this
ability, or only at substantially higher costs, GE could be expected
to attract new clients and retain existing ones. Ultimately, this
would lead to the foreclosure of the market and the strengthening
of GE's existing dominance. 2 2 A similar approach was taken by
the Commission with regard to the strengthening of GE's already
dominant position in the market for engines for large regional air-
craft.253 In the market for engines for corporate jets, the Commis-
sion used the concept of potential bundling to determine the crea-
tion of a dominant position for the new company.25 4
Although it is probably true that the new company would in-
deed have the potential to bundle and it cannot be ruled out that at
one point in time it might engage in this behavior, using this po-
tential to conclude that the merger would strengthen a pre-existing
dominant position within the meaning of ECMR Article 2 is ques-
tionable. Though the Commission is required by ECMR Article 2
249 Id. para. 293.
250 The Commission did state that bundling has repeatedly occurred in the
industry. Id. para. 352. Dimitri Giotakos, Laurent Petit, Gaelle Gamier, and Peter
de Luyk of DGlV argue that the incentives for the merged entity to sell bundles of
products could have evolved over the short to medium term. Dimitri Giotakos et
al., General Electric/Honeywell-An Insight into the Commissions Investigation and De-
cision, CoMPETIoN Poucy NEWSLETTER No. 3, Oct 2001, at 10.
251 GE/Honeywell, supra note 7, para. 412 (emphasis added). See also id. para.
434 (addressing the market for large regional aircraft), para. 443 (addressing the
market for corporate jet aircraft).
252 Id. para. 412.
253 Id. paras. 432-34.
254 Id. paras. 443-44.
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to look at several aspects of a merger, and while conglomerate ef-
fects255 may, under certain circumstances, have a significant effect
on the relevant market,256 it seems that the approach taken by the
Commission in GE/Honeywell overstepped the line of adequate as-
sessment and lacks support under the ECMR. There is no express
provision therein nor decision of the ECJ or CFI interpreting the
Regulation to support the Commission's assessment. The Com-
mission must have been aware of this because it issued a statement
stating that "various economic analyses have been subject to theo-
retical controversy." 257 Describing the question of whether it is
permissible to block a merger because of possible future bundling
as theoretical understates its impact. This question strikes at the
heart of EC merger control and can (and will) have serious reper-
cussions on the conception and future application of the ECMR.
This is not to say that bundling services and goods should not be
subject to rigorous scrutiny by the Commission. On the contrary,
the scenarios envisioned by the Commission require constant at-
tention. However, the tool for this investigation is and must be EC
Article 82, not the ECMR.
The parties tried to overcome the Commission's concerns by
undertaking not to engage in bundling.258 The Commission re-
garded this effort as insufficient. It argued that the undertaking
was "purely behavioral and as such cannot constitute the basis for
a clear elimination of the said concerns."259 Even more interest-
ingly, the Commission continued by saying that by not engaging in
bundling, "the parties would become dominant or strengthen their
dominant position but promise not to abuse it."260 Remarkably, the
Commission, in its own statement, admits that it must have erred
255 Conglomerate effects describe the effect that may occur when merger par-
ties are neither horizontal competitors nor active in vertically related markets.
256 This effect is mainly financial, i.e., the addition of the financial position of
entities that are active in different markets. See, e.g., The decisions of the German
Bundeskartellamt, Rheinmetall/WMF, WuW/E Kart 1867, affd, by the German
Supreme Court, BGH, Edelstahlbestecke, WuW/E BGH 2150. See also Monti, su-
pra note 12, at 6.
257 Francesco Guerrera, Companies & Finance the Americas: How 'Dominance'
Became Europe's Dirty Word in Takeovers, FIN. TIMEs, Oct. 4, 2001. Patterson and
Shapiro, supra note 62, at 18, argue that the decision "is based on dubious eco-
nomic grounds and very weak evidence."
258 GE/Honeywell, supra note 7, para. 498.
259 Id. para. 530.
260 Id. para. 532.
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in its earlier finding that the potential to bundle may be a factor for
the creation or strengthening of a dominant position. Now the
Commission appears to separate bundling from the dominance is-
sue (which would have been correct in the first place) and empha-
sizes the question of whether or not bundling in and of itself
amounts to an abuse of a dominant position under EC Article 82.
This is the correct approach and the Commission should have used
it from the outset instead of using bundling as a factor in estab-
lishing the strengthening of dominance.
It has been argued that the concept of bundling had no valid
foundation in European merger control and has not been applied
before. While the first statement appears to be correct, the second
one is not.261 In Guinness/Grand Metropolitan,262 a decision under
the ECMR, two producers and distributors of spirits proposed to
merge. The Commission found that there were different markets
for different spirits and for different countries in which the parties
were not active alongside each other and thus, that the merger had
only limited horizontal effect.263 However, the Commission was of
the opinion that the merger would lead to a larger portfolio which
would benefit the new company vis-h-vis its competitors because it
would be able to offer a range of products that would give it
greater flexibility to structure its prices, promotions, and discounts.
The merger would bring about a higher potential for tying and
261 Francisco-Enrique Gonzales-Diaz refers to the Commission's investigation
in Tetra Pak as a precedent for its decision in GE/Honeywell. Roundtable Discussion,
supra note 133, at 11. However, this case was about the abuse of a dominant posi-
tion (with elements of predatory pricing, tying, rebates, etc.) under Article EC 82
and not a merger decision. While it is true that the Commission in its assessment
of dominance can and does rely on the proximity to EC Article 82 and on the case
law of the ECJ pertaining to this provision, these principles may only be applied
mutatis mutandis. Cf. Kauper, supra note 48, at 321 ("However 'dominant position'
is defined, the language of the Merger Regulation suggests that the Commission is
likely to measure competitive harm in terms of injury to competitors."). The case
law on EC Article 82 has thus only limited relevance for merger control reviews.
Closer to the concept of bundling as applied by the Commission in GE/Honeywell
was an investigation of Digital Equipment under Article 85(1) of the EC Treaty.
See XXVIIth Report on Competition Policy, para. 69 (1997), available at http:
//europa.eu.int/comm/competition/publications/broch97_enpdf. Here the
Commission objected to the fact that Digital offered prices that were more attrac-
tive when customers purchased software services in a package with hardware
services than when purchasing software services alone.
262 Case IV/M.938, Guinness/Grand Metropolitan v. Commission, 1998 0.J.
(L 288) 24 [hereinafter Guinness/Grand Metropolitan].
263 Id. para. 31.
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would put the new company in a position to realize economies of
scale and scope in its sales and marketing activities. 264 Thus Guin-
ness/Grand Metropolitan was a "precedent" for GEIHoneywvell-and
in its time received fierce criticism.265 However, since the parties in
Guinness/Grand Metropolitan made a number of substantial under-
takings, 266 the merger finally received the Commission's blessing -
and therefore substantially less publicity than GE/Honeyzell two
years later.
Having criticized the position of the Commission as being
without sufficient basis in the ECMR, and having thus joined the
dominant chorus of commentators on the decision, it must also be
observed that the issue of bundling, despite the publicity it re-
ceived, was not as decisive as it has been portrayed. In fact, it was
not a major component of the actual Commission decision, consti-
tuting only two pages out of the 130 page document, and the
merger would most likely have been stopped if the Commission
had omitted the issue altogether because of the horizontal and ver-
tical effects of the merger already referred to. One is thus com-
pelled to ask why the Commission bothered to take on the issue in
the first place, stirring up as much controversy as it did. The
Commission may well not have foreseen this reaction, or the
Commission may have wanted to base its negative vote on as
many arguments as possible to make it more legitimate and ac-
ceptable. One desired effect of this strategy could be to create
precedent for future decisions where the Commission may have to
rely on the question of bundling.
4.2.2.1.3. Impediment of Competition
As outlined above, in order to meet the requirements of Article
ECMR 2(3), not only must the concentration have a dominant po-
264 Id. para. 40. The Commission took a similar position a few months earlier
in Case 1V/M.833, The Coca Cola Company/Carlsberg A/S, 1998 OJ. (L 145) 41,
where the Commission concluded that a larger portfolio of different beverages
would give a company an advantage over its competitors: "Generally this means
that companies with... the broadest portfolio of beverages in their distribution
system will have the lowest costs and be able to reach the highest number of cus-
tomers." Id. para. 68.
265 See SIMON BISHOP & MIKE WALKER, THE ECONOMICS OF EC COMPETITION
LAW: CONCEPTS, APPLICATION AND MEASUREMENT para. 6.42 (1999) (stating that the
merger has no sound economic basis); Carl Shapiro's remarks in Roundtable Dis-
cussion, supra note 133, at 17 (saying the merger "lacks sound economic basis").
266 Guinness/Grand Metropolitan, supra note 262, para. 183.
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sition but this position must result in an appreciable impediment
of competition within the Common Market.
In GE/Honeywell, the Commission did not take the desirable
step and inserted a new headline into its decision under which it
would have answered the question whether or not competition
would be impeded by the merger. One possible conclusion one
could draw from this omission is that, contrary to what has been
found earlier,267 there is no two-tier test but only one, which is suf-
ficient to establish the creation or strengthening of dominance.
However, when one looks at what the Commission actually says in
the decision, it becomes dear that this is merely an omission on the
part of another headline, whereas the substance of the question of
impediment was addressed and answered in the affirmative.
4.2.2.2. Market for Avionics
Another key market that attracted the Commission's attention
was Avionics. As already pointed out, this market was also of
particular interest because of the opportunities it gave to GE and
Honeywell in terms of a possible bundling.
Avionics products include equipment used for the control of
the aircraft, for navigation and communication, as well as for the
assessment of flying conditions. 268 In Avionics, Honeywell had a
market share of between 50% to 60%. Its main competitors were
Rockwell Collins with a share of 20% to 30%, Thales, with a share
of between 10% to 20%, and Smiths Industries with a share of up to
10%.269 Again, the position of Honeywell, in sheer-terms of market
share, was very strong.
As already mentioned, in the eyes of the Commission, the
merged entity would be able to offer a package of products that
had never been put on the market together prior to the merger and
that could not be challenged by any other competitor on its own.
The sale of complementary products through package deals may
take several forms. It may include, for instance, mixed bundling
whereby complementary products are sold together at a price that,
owing to discounts applied across the product range, is lower than
the price charged when sold separately. It may also take the form
267 See supra Section 2.1.21.
m GE/Honeywell, supra note 7, para. 231. See also Case COMP/M.1601, Al-
lied Signal/Honeywell v. Commission, 2001 O.J. (L 152) 1.
269 GE/Honeywe, supra note 7, para. 242.
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of pure bundling whereby the entity sells only the bundle but does
not make individual components available on a stand-alone basis.
Pure bundling may also take the form of technical bundling,
whereby the individual components only function effectively as
part of the bundled system, and cannot be used alongside compo-
nents from other suppliers. In other words, they are made incom-
patible with the competitor's components. 270  The proposed
merged entity would have been able to price its packaged deals in
such a way as to induce customers to buy GE and Honeywell
products rather than those of its competitors, thus increasing the
combined share of GE Honeywell on both markets.
In terms of the question of vertical integration of Honeywell
with GE, the Commission objected for the same reasons as with its
corporate jet aircraft engine market analysis. It felt the combina-
tion of Honeywell with GE's financial strength and vertical inte-
gration in financial services, aircraft purchasing and leasing, as
well as in after-market services, would contribute to the foreclo-
sure effect already described.271 Following the proposed merger,
the Commission predicted Honeywell's product range would
benefit from GE Capital's ability to secure exclusive positions for
its product with airlines and GECAS' instrumental leverage ability
to foster the placement of GE Products, thus extending its "GE
only" policy to Honeywell products.272
GE's strategic use of GECAS and GE Capital's financial
strength would position Honeywell as a dominant supplier of avi-
onics where it already enjoys leading positions. In light of their in-
ability to reproduce financial strength and integration to any sig-
nificant degree, rival manufacturers would progressively
reconsider their strategy and choose not to compete fiercely in
those markets dominated by the merged entity.
4.2.2.3. Market for Engine Starters
In view of Honeywell's horizontal position within the market
for aircraft engines,273 the Commission also emphasized the market
for engine starters. 274 Honeywell's share in this market was esti-
270 Id. para. 351.
271 Id. para. 405.
272 Id. para. 406.
273 See infra Section 4.2.2.1.
274 GE/Honeywell, supra note 7, paras. 331-40.
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mated to be between 50% to 60%. The only real competitor for
Honeywell in this market was Hamilton Sundstrand, with a share
of between 40% to 50%. However, since Hamilton Sundstrand's
starters are only installed in the engines of its sister company, Pratt
& Whitney,27 5 they are not available in the general market. Ham-
ilton therefore could not be considered a competitor. Honeywell
would thus be the only large independent supplier of engine start-
ers.
The Commission concluded that through the merger with GE
and its horizontal effects previously discussed, Honeywell would
become dominant in the market 76
In order to overcome the Commission's concerns in this field,
the parties offered to divest Honeywell's engine starter business.2 7
The Commission's reaction was that it interpreted the offer to
mean that the would-be divested business would not include cer-
tain parts that needed to be purchased together. Since the new
company would try to command this part of the market, the di-
vestiture could not have the necessary effect.2 8
5. CONCLUSION
The fact that the European and U.S. merger control systems are
based on different approaches was well known long before the
Commission's decision in GE/Honeywvell. It was also clear that, in
view of the ever-increasing number of international mergers, it was
only a question of time before the two different systems would ar-
rive at different conclusions.
As the first wave of heated discussion subsides, it should be
clear that the discussion should not revolve around which system
is better:27 there is, yet, no possibility of one system adapting to
the other.280 Rather, as with any judicial or administrative decision,
275 In this respect the figures given for the market share reflect production
volume and not sales in the market Hamilton, by supplying Pratt & Whitney, has
a lower market share in the overall engine market. Id. para. 338.
276 Id. para. 341.
277 Id. para. 493.
2n Id. para. 516.
279 Cf. Briggs & Rosenblatt, supra note 13, at 30 (arguing that both the U.S. and
EC authorities may have had valid reasons for their decisions).
290 Cf. Monti, supra note 12, at 17 ("[Plerfect convergence will never be
achieved-a degree of divergence is unavoidable in a multi-polar world of sover-
eign jurisdictions, each with its own laws, enforcement authorities and courts.");
Greaney, supra note 107, at 892 (arguing that the EU's adoption of American poli-
2002]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
the discussion should focus on the question of whether the deci-
sion was properly based on the rules of the ECMR. Here the
Commission's decision contains a number of points that deserve
further discussion.
First of all, it is questionable whether the idea of bundling has a
sufficiently legitimate basis in the ECMR. This was a major issue
in the discussion about the validity of the Commission's decision,
and there is much argument that there was no such basis and that
the Commission, by applying this test, improperly changed the
scope of the ECMR. Henceforth, merger parties must fear that the
Commission, when assessing a proposed merger, will not only
identify the relevant markets in the traditional sense and assess the
horizontal and vertical effects created by the merger, but will also
speculate how positions in markets that are not related might be
combined, even if there is no clear evidence that such behavior will
emerge. This approach not only takes away much of the legal cer-
tainty which was the major strength of the merger control process,
but also blurs the distinction between merger control and post-
merger EC Article 82 investigations. The type of behavior that had
been addressed by the Commission requires a certain degree of
evidence to act upon, and in the case of GE/Honeyzvell, there was
not enough of that evidence available. It is therefore commendable
that GE and Honeywell have launched separate appeals against
the Commission's decision to the CFI-despite the fact that the
merger in any event would not be revived.28' In a few years' time,
cies would "serve neither the EU's interest in effective antitrust enforcement nor
promote the need for a more certain rules governing border-spanning mergers").
However, the Commission in its ECMR Review Green Paper suggested that it is
"an appropriate opportunity to open up a wider debate on the respective merits
of the two tests, particularly in view of the acknowledged desirability of striving
towards a greater degree of global convergence in merger control standards."
ECMR Review Green Paper, supra note 39, paras. 11, 167. There has also been, for
some time, talk about creating a new set of international competition law rules.
See, e.g., Sir Leon Brittan, A Framework for International Competition, Address at
the World Competition Forum (Feb. 3, 1992) (referring to the WTO as an appro-
priate forum for devising rules on competition or the efforts by the Global Com-
petition Network, an informal discussion round of high ranking competition offi-
cials from Europe and the United States). For an overview of recent attempts for
an international competition regime, see Baker, supra note 1, at 583-87, and
Rodger, supra note 1, at 312-19.
281 The parties apparently fear that some of the Commission's findings, espe-
cially those pertaining to the position of GE in the jet engine market, could be
used by competitors in future disputes.
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it will be known if the CFI, or ultimately the ECJ, will condone the
position of the Commission.
Having elaborated on the validity of the bundling issue, it must
also be stated that this question attracted far more attention outside
the merger decision than within. First, the question of bundling
was of fairly limited importance in terms of the overall decision,
and, taking into account the space the Commission assigned to it,
the Commission clearly intended it to be that way. Second, the
question of bundling was by no means decisive for the outcome of
the investigation. On the contrary, it could probably have been left
out without changing the outcome.
Apart from the controversial question of bundling, it is fair to
say that the Commission's decision appears to fall within the limits
of European merger control. This does not mean that some of the
results and findings of the Commission could not have arrived at a
different disposition. On the contrary, for example, there are good
arguments that the Commission could have, and indeed should
have, given less weight to the importance of GE's financial arm.
This could have resulted in GE not being assigned a dominant po-
sition in the first place, thus increasing the likelihood that the
merger may have been approved. However, the Commission was
within its margin of discretion in emphasizing the various factors
and parameters as it did.
GE/Honeywell will not be the end of the story of two merger
control systems, both with strengths and weaknesses, appearing to
compete with each other. The European and U.S. authorities will
before long arrive again at different conclusions, and these deci-
sions, especially if they concern mergers that predominantly affect
the other jurisdiction, will cause further heated discussions. One
lesson that should have been learned from the decision is that there
is no "better" system. What GE/Honeywell has taught the United
States is that one must look very closely at how the Commission
interprets the ECMR and what conclusions can be drawn from that
interpretation.
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